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SECTION I
SUMMARY
A. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND APPROACH
This report discusses the technology and safety related to the
implementation of an Automated Mixed Traffic Vehicle (AMTV) system.
System concepts and technology status are reviewed and areas where
further development is needed are identified. Failure and hazard modes
are also analyzed and methods for prevention are suggested. The results
are intended as a guide for further efforts in AMTV system development for
both near-term and long-term applications.
The AMTV systems discussed include a low speed system, and a
hybrid system which can operate at the low speed and at a higher speed
within a protected right-of-way. The low speed system is a candidate for
a near-term demonstration and can be used in pedestrian malls, large
campuses and recreational parks. The hybrid system may have application,
after further development, on urban streets, in airports or in other
situations where longer distances may be involved. Examples are given
in Section II, which describe a shuttle service between two shopping
centers separated by many city blocks, and a tram-type system in a
pedestrian mall.
The; remainder of the study was conducted using the following
!lapproach` The physical elements of an AMTV system, both moving and
stationary, were first described in terms of system requirements and sub-
system specifications (Section III). Technology status was then evaluated
and required developments were identified within this framework (Section
IV). Based on the AMTV physical elements and operating concepts, a
comprehensive safety analysis was conducted to examine potential hazards
caused by hardware failures and by events unrelated to hardware failure.
Corrective and preventive actions in terms of design modifications
or operatial procedures were suggested (Section V).
B. MAJOR FINDINGS
1. Initial Demonstration
Straightforward development using current technology will make it
possible to demonstrate a low speed AMTV system in three to five years.
With a prudent, fail-safe design, and appropriate right-of-way protection,
the AMTV system can operate safely in an environment containing pedestrians.
An initial demonstration should restrict the mixed-traffic environment
in order to ensure safety during the learning period.
Work needed to implement the demonstration would include the
following:
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(1) optical headway sensors to provide better frontal coverage,
quicker response, and the added capability of sensing in
the direction of a turn.
(2) Bumper switches to provide both backup protection against
collision, and a smooth, compliant surface that would minimize
the chance of injury. Such a bumper switch should extend
around the sides of the vehicle.
(3) Design of a suitable vehicle matched to the application,
and where possible, using existing automated guideway tech-
nology.
(4) Control logic improvements to provide flexibility and added
capability.
Roadside equipment may also be needed for system check-out and
automatic scheduling control. The use of roadside sensors for control at
crossing points should also be considered.
Further work is needed to ensure safety, including:
(1) A review of the AMTV system design to ensure hardware relia-
bility and to apply fail-safe design principles to all vital
guidance and control subsystems.
(2) Development of means to prevent the AMTV from moving premature-
ly while passengers are boarding; perhaps by an interlocking
door mechanism.
(3) Development of effective procedures for route surveillance,
system checkout, fault recovery, and maintenance.
(4) Consideration of the effect of weather (rain, mud, ice and
snow) on system operation.
(5) Development of a clear definition of right of way and passenger
access
(6) Development of procedures to inform the public about the char-
acteristics of the AMTV.
2.	 Urban Application
Subsequent to an initial demonstration, a hybrid AMTV system
could be developed for applications involving longer distances. This
system would consist of low-speed route sections for passenger pick-up and
delivery, and high-speed route sections for longer-distance connection
between the low-speed sections.. On a low-speed section, the AMTV would
behave like the initial demonstration system mentioned above. On a
high-speed section, however, means must be provided to separate the AMTV
pathway from pedestrians and other vehicles because of the longer stopping
distance. It is not accurate to refer to this pathway isolation as
a guideway, in the sense that it is a track that steers the vehicle,
1-2	
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since the guidance and headway protection will continue to be electronic.
Instead, we refer to it as a semi-guideway, because of the similarity
to a true guideway, and because the AMTV would not require a continuous,
unbroken, grade-separated right-of-way. At traffic intersections the
AMTV could cross either using grade separations or at-grade using traffic
signals and barriers coupled to the AMTV control system.
Initially, pathway protection can be accomplished by means of
physical barriers such as fences and curbs. However, after public aware-
ness of the system characteristics is developed, the needed pathway
assurance may well be met by the use of accepted rules, like those
governing a bikeway, together with expected advances in sensor technology.
This extension would permit future use of the pathway by other vehicles.
A 20 mph AMTV operating in an unrestricted mixed-traffic environment is
not felt to be reasonable in the near future; research leading to new
sensing technology must come first.
The low-speed section and high-speed section can be considered as
modular functional elements that may be combined in various ways to
configure urban applications with varying geometry. The underlying
technology can be discussed by examining AMTV operation on a typical
low-speed section and on a typical high-speed section, together with some
consideration of the interconnection. While much of the technology
developed for the initial demonstration can be extended for use
in a hybrid system, still further development and new system concepts
are needed for high-speed operation.
Although determination of the best speed for each mode must await
further experience, the values selected for initial study are 7 mph
for the low speed, and 20 mph for the high speed.
A long-range headway sensor must be developed for 20-mph operation,
having a sensing range of 125 feet; the distance required to stop a
20-mph vehicle with moderate deceleration. Reliable detection of other
AMTV's and automobiles at this distance is achievable by modification
of the present type of optical headway sensors. This approach, however,
does not ensure timely detection of smaller, dark targets due to limita-
tions on light source power. Based on the expected capability of such a
long-range sensor, a reasonable collision avoidance philosophy for an
AMTV operating at 20-mph in a semi-guideway is to perform a routine
programmed low-deceleration stop for another AMTV or an automobile, and
to use special control logic combined with fast braking to stop for
pedestrians or smaller-size obstructions which have violated the guide-
way barriers, and are not detected at 125 feet. Roadside sensors to
detect guideway violation and signal a slower speed to the AMTV should
also receive attention.
In the long-term, after community familiarity with the AMTV is
established, crossing of streets with other vehicular traffic will
become possible under appropriate conditions, using coupled traffic
signal control or stop signs. When an AMTV must make a turn it must
interact with the signals at the intersection; therefore, development
of an appropriate signaling procedure will be necessary. Another valu-
able precaution will be a stationary sensor system capable of detecting
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ea potentially dangerous vehicle at the intersection (such as a car
about to run a red light) and signaling the AMTV to stop until the
danger passes.
C.	 RECOMMENDATIONS
A list of items which must be developed for E , initial demonstra-
tion, and others for a longer-term urban application are summarized
in Table 4-1.
To ensure safe and smooth introduction of an AMTV system into pub-
lic service, the system must be mature in design and free of defects.
For this reason, any AMTV system design must be tested in a controlled
environment before it is committed to public service. Reduction of
accident risk, the elimination of bugs and the implementation of desir-
able design changes are important steps which should be taken before
introducing the new technology to the public. In addition, the use of
attendants for insuring safe and reliable operation during the initial
learning phase of an AMTV demonstration should not be overlooked.
The attendants should not be perceived as drivers, and perhaps do not
need to be seen as uniformed employees by the public. They could be
positioned either in the vehicle or at strategic roadside locations, and
could perform the safety backup function with an unobtrusive box having
a "stop" command button. They might also assist with fault recovery,
using a key - activated manual control box. The AMTV need not have a
conventional automotive driver's station.
OINAL PAGE 1b
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SECTION II
INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is to review the technology used in an
Automated Mixed Traffic Vehicle (AMTV) system, to identify areas where
further development is either required or desirable, and to conduct a
safety analysis of an AMTV system. In both parts of the report the goal
was to develop recommendations which could act as a guide for further
development of the AMTV concept. The report addresses the problem of
developing an AMTV capable of operating in an environment containing
both pedestrians and vehicular traffic. Attainment of true mixed traf-
fic capability is assumed to be the long-term goal, but it is recognized
that an initial demonstration must be in a more restricted environment.
B. BACKGROUND
The AMTV concept has been described in an earlier paper (Ref. 1).
Basically, it offers a cost-effective alternative to conventional busses
or other transportation modes for many applications requiring frequent,
low speed service, since both the cost for a driver on each vehicle and
the large investment required for exclusive guideway construction can be
avoided.
A feasibility demonstration of an AMTV, using what was basically A
breadboard vehicle, was conducted at JPL during early 1976. Results from,
this experiment are reported in Reference 1. Data genrated by the JPL
vehicle and experiment form a baseline for developing the technology and
hardware sections of this report. The experiment used a wire-following
steering system patterned after work of Fenton and Olson at Ohio State
University (Refs. 2 and 3). Similar techniques have been used by a
number of investigators, and reliable speeds of 50 mph have been demon-
strated (Refs. 4 and 5). The sensors used for collision avoidance were
developed at JPL, and were derived from earlier work on sensing for
remote manipulation applications (Refs. 6 and 7).
Although the JPL vehicle is a small electric tram, any type of
vehicle could be incorporated into a future AMTV system, with the size
and type of vehicle being determined by the service requirements of the
,specific application. A number of guideway systems employing automated
vehicles have recently been put into service. Requirements of these
vehicles are quite similar to those of an AMTV, except for the provision
for collision-avoidance (headway) sensing, and the steering mechaniza-
tion. Experience derived from development of these guideway systems is
therefore likely to be useful in further AMTV vehicle control develop-
ment. Some existing guideway systems with relatively small vehicles and
related reference documents are:
2-1
(1) Morgantown (Ref. 8)
(2) Airtrans, Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport (Ref. 9)
(3) Seattle/Tacoma Airport Shuttle (Ref. 10)
Another type of automated vehicle system that may offer applicable
experience is the automated mail cart or automated warehousing vehicle
system (Refs. 11 to 13). These systems may employ relatively complex
multi-loop routing controls, but are very low-speed systems without the
headway sensing capability required for higher speed service.
C.	 SCOPE OF STUDY
The present status of the technology needed for an AMTV was examin-
ed with respect to two stages of application, which are further described
later in this section. The first example of an application is one which
would be appropriate for an initial demonstration of any AMTV system,
which might take place in 3-5 years time. The environment of the ini-
tial system should be relatively benign and the developments needed are
fairly straightforward. The second example of an application is a more
challenging one, and assumes an urban CBD type of environment. Further
developments required for such an AMTV system are identified. These
developments are discussed primarily in terms of today's technology, but
some of the improvements or added capabilities represent fairly signifi-
cant extrapolation from present experience, and may require: advances in
the basic technology employed. These long-range developments are identi-
fied as such in the text.
Finally, it should be recognized that an AMTV system is a new
concept, and its implementation will involve many non-technical questions
during the initial period when operators, users and other traffic are
familiarizing themselves with the new type of service. Possible ques-
tions are:
(1) What special traffic rules or laws need to be made for the
AMTV, if any?
(2) How ^,.hould operation be funded; should there be fares?
(3) How will user preference features be taken into account?
(4) How will passenger security be affected by vandalism and
pranksters?
(5) Can passengers be allowed to assist in case of a minor prob-
lem (such as a delivery truck parked on the route)?
Investigation of these questions is beyond the scope of this study,
which is primarily concerned with the technology required to implement
an AMTV system.
a
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In the safety analysis, no preconceived constraints were defined:._
However, it soon became apparent that many of the issues identified were
not unique to the AMTV concept or the technology required to implement it,
but are also found in existing transportation systems. Therefore, in
order to limit the amount of data treated in the safety analysis, the
following criteria were applied:
(1) Hazards which are common to other transportation modes or
activities such as earthquake, or falling objects, were not
treated in detail.
(2) Social hazards, such as vandalism and crimi- al attack were
not treated.
Identified items of this type were left in the raw data, and
presented in Appendix A, for reference.
D. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT
In the remainder of this section, the twp examples of AMTV applica-
tion previously mentioned are described in morn detail.
Section III presents general requirements appropriate to an AMTV
system, independent of any specific implementation of the hardware.
Definitions of the necessary AMTV subsystems are given. Such definitions
are, of course, somewhat arbitrary, since the partitioning of system
functions is never unique. It is felt, however, that the functions
identified will be present in similar form in any AMTV system, and
therefore the definitions presented have general validity. The subsys-
tems of the present JPL AMTV were used as a baseline, and other elements
were added to it to form the complete system. Following the subsystem
definitions, performance specifications for each subsystem are identifi-
ed to the extent now possible. These specifications are still general,
but take into account conclusions drawn from the JPL experiment and from
the safety analysis presented in Section V.
Section IV discusses development activities required to demon-
strate an AMTV system. Technology developments necessary in order to
implement a near term demonstration are recommended. Further develop-
ments and long-range research needed for an ultimate AMTV application
are separately identified.
In section V, the procedures used in conducting the safety analysis
are described, the results are interpreted, and suggestions are made for
implementation of the results.
The Hazard Catalog and associated data developed in the safety
analysis are contained in Appendix A. Similarly, a failure mode catalog
is contained in Appendix B. 'The conclusions and recommendations of
Section V were developed from the analysis of data described in Appendix-
es A and B.
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Brief analytical models for various elements of the AMTV are
presented in Appendix C.
E.	 AN EXAMPLE OF AN AMTV APPLICATION
This section describes a potential AMTV application in an urban
environment in order to provide a baseline for developing more detailed
descriptions of the AFITV and its subsystems in subsequent sections.
The example selected incorporates the main features which are considered
technically feasible in a future system, and illustrates the utility of
the AMTV from the user point of view. The capability of operating an
AMTV in the type of environment described here is felt to be a desirable
developmental goal.
The application envisioned provides shopper shuttle service between
two large shopping centers separated by a distance of one mile or more,
as illustrated in Figure 2-1. In addition to the shuttle function, low-
speed service is also provided within each shopping area. For this
application, a service with high schedule frequency is envisioned, but
not high passenger throughput much as would be encountered in line haul
rapid transit at rush hour.
In each shopping center, the route passes through parking lot
type areas as indicated in Figure 2-2, where both pedestrian and low-
speed vehicular traffic is encountered. The vehicle travels at its low
speed in this environment. Brief (3-4 second) stops are made either
routinely or on demand at predetermined points to permit passengers to
enter or leave the tram. With an appropriate (probably electric) vehicle,
part of the route could pass through the interior of the shopping mall
building, where the AMTV would operate in a purely pedestrian environment.
Between the two shopping centers, the route follows a semi-guideway,
which is an on-grade vehicle path reserved for the AMTV by fencing or
curbing. Alternatively, distinctive lane markings, together with rules
similar to those presently governing bikeways may be used to define the
AMTV pathway. The vehicle cruises at high speed while in the semi-guideway.
The guideway protection does not extend through intersections, but
rather the AMTV is coupled to conventional traffic signals in such a way
that safe passage across each intersection is ensured. Fixed auxilliary
devices are required;.to detect intrusion into the guideway by other
vehicles or pedestrians, and also to ensure that a red traffic signal is
not violated by vehicular cross traffic. Figure 2-3 depicts the high-
speed route sections. Retractible barriers are shown in the figure
to provide physical protection from cross traffic. Actuation of the
barriers would be coupled with AMTV control and the traffic signals.
They would be raised within the red period for cross traffic while
an AMTV is crossing. Designated locations for passenger pickup are
incorporated at approximately one block intervals. '!urns would be
made at intersections, with appropriate traffic signal coupling.
ORIGINAL PAUL iz
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Figure 2-1. An Example of an AMTV Application---Overview
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Figure 2-2. An Example of an AMV Application---Low-Speed
Route Section in Terminal Areas
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Figure 2-3. An Example of an AMTV Application---Nigh-Speed
Route Section
in general, an AMTV may have three speed modes; the high-speed and
low-speed modes already mentioned and an additional 1-1/2 mph mode which
will always be incorporated as a part of the basic vehicle control system.
Appropriate headway sensing for each speed mode is incorporated in each
vehicle for collision avoidance. A distinctly different type of AMTV
could be used in certain specialized applications in a purely pedestrian
environment and would operate in the 1-1/2 mph speed mode only.
In order to make these examples specific for the more detailed
discussion of AMTV system design to follow, a speed of 7 mph was selected
for the low speed mode, and 20 mph for the high speed mode. A speed
of 7 mph, used in the JPL experiment, is a reasonable compromise, permitting
an average speed comfortably faster than walking with moderate sensing
requirements. A 20 mph mode would be satisfying for longer distances
(> 1 mile), but presents considerably more difficult sensing requirements.
However, these speeds are not fixed; their choice at this point is
somewhat arbitrary. It will be necessary to accumulate much more experience
with the AMTV concept before it is possible to decide on the best speeds.
It should be further emphasized that the application illustrated
in Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 is hypothetical, and intended only as a
framework against which the AMTV technology can be discussed. It is
not intended to specify what the possible AMTV applications might be.
The different speed modes and accompanying types of route environment
can be used in different combinations to satisfy the requirements of
applications quite different from the example described above. For
instance, an inter-terminal shuttle operating on an airport apron could
utilize the 20 mph semi-guideway mode, only. The type of vehicle used
would differ depending on the specific requirements of the application;
a 20 mph AMTV would likely be a closed bus type vehicle, while an AMTV
vehicle used in a route limited to a 7 mph speed may be an open tram
configuration for faster boarding. A complete AMTV system will also
require a vehicle storage and maintenance area which is not shown in
the figures. For the purposes of this report, it is assumed that the
geographic location of the AMTV system is one not subject to heavy snowfall
or icing conditions. System operation should continue during rainy
weather.
F.	 EXAMPLE OF AN INITIAL DEMONSTRATION
The application selected for an initial AMTV system demonstration
must be in a considerably more restricted environment than the example
just described. During the early phase of AMTV development, it is particu-
larly important that the exposure of the AMTV to automobile and truck
traffic be controlled in order to minimize the risk of accident or
injury while operational experience is gained. It is also expected that
an initial demonstration will be relatively modest in scope.
Two types of environment can be suggested for an initial demonstra
tion:
(1) Shuttle service in an industrial or public complex where vehicu-
lar traffic does exist, but with controlled access. Control-
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led vehicular access implies that interacting drivers are
selected in some way, for example by requiring a pass to be
shown, and that traffic is more orderly a less dense than
would be typical of a busy urban street. An initial applica-
tion in an industrial environment also has the advantage that
the interacting population can be more effectively informed
of the utility, rules-of-the-road, and possible hazards
of an AMTV system.
(2) A shopping mall shuttle in a pedestrian environment, as illus-
trated in Figure 2-4. An open court-like environment is
envisioned, like that created by the conversion of a shopping
center street into a mall. Alternatively, the AMTV route might
encircle a parking lot or deliver passengers to the parking
lot entrance, but it would not travel on streets used by the
general public for vehicular traffic. The AMTV would interact
only with pedestrian traffic. As shown in the figure, plant-
ers or curbings can be used to further isolate the AMTV path.
The degree of isolation is a safety consideration, and is a
variable that should be expected to change as public familiar-
ity with the system increases, and as the sensing technology
becomes more sophisticated.
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Figure 2-4. Near Term Demonstration System --- Sho;ping Mall
SECTION III
SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This section proposes system requirements, subsystem definitions
and functional requirements for 1-112 mph, 7 mph, and 7/20 mph hybrid
Automated Mixed Traffic Vehicle (AMTV) systems. These requirements
serve as a conceptual framework within which safety can be analyzed
and needed technology developments can be identified. Because system
and subsystem functions mutually interact with safety considerations,
the requirements stated in this section reflect an iterative process
of combining the results of the safety analysis given in Section V
with the system requirements developed in the early part of this section.
Requirements for the 7 mph AMTV are based on the experience gained
in the development and operation of the experimental 7 mph AMTV at
JPL and are largely carried over from that design (see Ref. 1). Other
system requirements are developed with reference to the assumed appli-
cations given in the previous section.
B. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The overall AMTV concept requires consideration of route configu-
ration, passenger interfaces and protection, vehicle operation, regulation
of the traffic environment, intersection handling, route condition,
system checkout, fault recovery, storage and maintenance, and level-
of-service control. The system requirements which integrate each of these
aspects are briefly described below.
1.	 Route Configuration
The route for a 7/20 mph hybrid AMTV system consists of 7 mph
intermittent-stop and 20 mph express sections. On a 7 mph section, the
AMTV operates at or below 7 mph picking up and discharging passengers,
and sharing the roadway with pedestrians and slowly moving vehicles.
Examples of a 7 mph section include large parking facilities, shopping
malls or other pedestrian areas, bikeway type lanes on city streets,
traffic intersections and other gaps in a semi-guideway route section.
On a 20 mph semi-guideway section, the AMTV operates at constant speed,
slowing as necessary for curves, traffic signals or as it approaches
a 7 mph section. It also slows down when an obstacle is detected in
the pathway and will, if necessary, come to a full stop to avoid colliding
with it. For safe operation, the 20 mph section right-of-way requires
fences, or curbs to separate pedestrians and vehicles from the AMTV
path. In a similar way, 1-1/2 mph sections may be programmed into
7 mph AMTV route segments, for example, at a U-turn. 	
Y,
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2.	 Passenger Interfaces and Protection
a. AMTV Boarding. Because random boarding would cause excessive
delays, marked passenger stops would be provided in a 7 mph or 7/20 mph
hybrid system. A 1 -1/2 mph AMTV could operate as a moving platform,
allowing passengers to enter or leave at any time without stopping
the vehicle. If traffic intersections are limited to pedestrians and
very light vehicles (bicycles, for example), a 7 mph vehicle can be
an open type tram to permit faster boarding.
Either 7 mph or 7/20 mph hybrid AMTVs will be programmed for a
predetermined standing time at each passenger stop to allow sufficient
time for boarding. Should boarding not be complete by the end of the
standing time, sensors must be installed to sense the presence of passengers
in the boarding zone and prevent the vehicle from moving off. Alternatively,
manually operated entrance doors equipped with jamb interlock switches
which will electrically inhibit vehicle motion until all doors are
closed and locked may be used. In addition, passenger operated emergency
push button switches located near the seats can be used as a back-up
system.
b. Capacity. There is no technical constraint on the size
and capacity of an AMTV. Therefore, accommodations can be based on
the expected level of service required for the particular application.
As examples, the experimental JPL AMTV has eight seats, but a 7/20 mph
hybrid AMTV for shuttle service between two shopping centers may well
have 20 or 30 seats. The straightforward relationship between AMTV
parameters and system capacity is given in Table 3-1. Service capacity
can be increased by increasing the capacity of each AMTV, adding more
AMTVs to the route or by forming multi-car trains using specially designed
tractors and trailers.
If desirable from an application standpoint, standing passengers
may be permitted on an AMTV if they remain clear of the boarding
entrances.	 In such cases, hand.grips must be provided, and vehicle
acceleration and jerk levels must be controlled to prevent throwing
standing passengers off balance.
C.	 Passenger Protection. A 7 mph AMTV should have an enclosed
body for protection of passengers in a side collision unless, as noted
above, it only interacts with pedestrians and/or very light vehicles.
However, for safety and passenger comfort, a 7/20 mph hybrid AMTV must
have an enclosed body with manually or automatically operated quick
opening doors. Emergency stop buttons should be provided for use by
passengers in the event of a collision, impending collision or on-board
emergency. A simple but reliable door mechanism should be used such
that if the door is not securely closed, the vehicle will not move.
While the vehicle is in motion, all doors will remain locked.
d.	 Passenger Comfort. Noise levels must be kept low and vehicle
vibrations in the horizontal, vertical and longitudinal directions
must be kept within acceptable limits (Ref. 14). Interior layout and
seat- spacing must be arranged to permit free passenger movement during
bcarding stops. Appropriate interior lighting should be provided.
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Table 3-1. Relationship Between AMTV System Capacity Parameters. (Values For nominal speed, stops per mile
and vehicles per mile are assumed. Ten second passenger stops are assumed.
	 Note that a 30
passenger vehicle with one door would require a longer stop period, not shown).
Nominal Stops Average Travel Vehicles Headway Line Capacity
AMTV per mi Speed time/mi per mi Interval 8 passenger	 30 passenger
Speed AMTV AMTV
mph mph min min pass./hr pass./hr
1.5 0 1.5 40 10 4 120 450
1.5 0 1.5 40 30 1.3 370 1380
h
7 15 5.0 12.0 2 6.0 80 300
7 5 6.2 9.7 6 1.6 300 1120
w-
w 7 10 5.5 10.9 6 1.8 270 1000
7 15 5.0 12.0 6 2.0 240 900
7 20 4.5 13.2 6 2.2 220 820
7 15 5.0 12.0 20 0.6 800 3000
20 4 13.9 4.3 1 4.3 110 420
20 1 18.1 3.3 3 1.1 440 1640
20 2 16.2 3.7 3 1.2 400 1500
O
20 4 13.9 4.3 3 1.4 340 1290
20 8 10.5 5.7 3 1.9 250 950
20 4 13.9 4.3 10 .43 1120 4190
Maximum vehicle acceleration and jerk rates shall be within the range
established as common practice in public transit vehicles.
	
3.	 AMTV Operation
a. Lateral Steering. An AMTV should track a fixed guidewire
reliably and in a fail-safe fashion.
b. Passenger Stops. An AMTV should come to a controlled stop
upon passenger request. Road-fixed devices should also be available
to command the same controlled stop. In more advanced systems, persons
at a designated boarding area may call for service. In such a case,
a call button either on the AMTV or at the passenger stop area could
cause the preset stop maneuver to be executed.
C.	 Headway Sensing. The A14TV must be able to sense obstacles
in its path, such as pedestrians, vehicles or potentially damaging
objects, and perform a controlled stop to avoid collision.
d. CollisionQ with Small Objects. If the AMTV bumper contacts
an object undetected by the headway sensors (such as a rock or
small animal), the emergency braking system will be activated to bring
the AMTV to a locked-wheel stop. The brakes will remain set until
the path is cleared. Procedures for restarting the AMTV must be developed.
e. Intersection Control. If an AMTV route passes through
or turns at an intersection, the intersection must be equipped with
four-way stop signs or traffic signals which are coupled with the AMTV
control system. In the latter case, the right-of-way of an AMTV within
the intersection must be fully protected by the traffic signal.
	
4.	 Route Constraints
a. Grades and Roughness. Normal grades found in typical city
streets (± 10%) and moderate dips, bumps and roughness of the road
surface should be acceptable. The vehicle design must be compatible
with the actual route surface to be used.
b. Weather Conditions. AMTV operation in rain or on wet surfaces
should be allowable.
C.	 Curves. The number of curves along an AMTV route should
be minimized and curve radii should be compatible with headway sensor
design. Where slowdown is necessary to permit safe negotiation of
a turn or curve, a positive signal must be provided to the AMTV by
the guidewire or a roadway marker.
d.	 Metal Covers and Gratings. The AMTV guidewire must be
continuous, and its function involves a.c. magnetic fields. Therefore,
the location of large steel objects such as manhole covers, gratings
or rails in the road surface must be compatible with guidewire placement.
Guide field distortion was found negligible for 7 mph travel with the
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guidewire 3 inches from the edge of a manhole cover; however, continuing
the pathway across such a metal plate presents a problem.
5. Fault Detection and Recovery
Any system fault, whether of a vehicle or of a fixed element, must
be signalled in a timely way to system operating personnel. Provisions
shall be made for manually steering or towing a failed AMTV to clear
the path of succeeding AMTVs or other traffic. Each AMTV should contain
a prominently posted placard giving instructions on how to deal with
the more likely emergency conditions. A system emergency plan should
be developed to deal with serious accidents..
6. Maintenance and Storaga
Facilities for off-line=:storage of vehicles, and procedures for
routine maintenance and repair of AMTVs should be provided.
7. Scheduling Control
A dispatching system, preferably automatic, is required to
maintain uniform AMTV vehicle spacing throughout the route and to
execute established level-of-service policies. The dispatching system
will accommodate daily and hourly variations in passenger demands to
provide consistent service at a reasonable system load factor.
8. Safety Provisions
The system shall be designed such that any single failure cannot
cause an unsafe condition. This provision may be met by applying fail-
safe design practices, including the use of redundancy. Where redundancy
is used, confirmation that each redundant element is operating properly
must be provided. Steering, braking, headway sensing and motor control
systems are critical functions which must have these provisions.
yw
C.	 SUBSYSTEM DEFINITIONS
A complete AMTV system contains both irehicles and .fixed elements.
This section defines both the subsystems associated with the vehicle and
those which are stationary elements. Their interrelationships are
depicted in Figure 3-1. The subsystem definitions fulfill the overall
system requirements discussed above.
1.	 Vehicle.Subsystems
a.	 Headway Sensing Subsystem. The headway sensing subsystem
contains an array of long and short range proximity sensors that can
detect obstacles far enough ahead of the AMTV to permit a controlled
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Figure 3-1. AMTV System Block Diagram
IL
stop, as well as front and side bumper switches that actuate on contact
with obstacles which have escaped detection by the proximity sensors.
The contact switches trigger a locked-wheel stop.
b.	 Steering Subsystem. The steering subsystem contains a
set of electromagnetic detectors that receive and resolve lateral error
signals from the electrically excited guide cable installed in the
pavement, plus the control actuators which operate the steering control
linkage to maintain the vehicle on course.
C.	 Control Logic Subsystem. The control logic subsystem
consists of the electronics and associated logic to receive inputs
from various sensors (headway, steering, tachometer, etc.) and on-board
switches and generate appropriate command signals for drive motor control
and braking subsystems.
d. DrivQ Motor Control Subsystem. The drive motor control
subsystem uses command signals from the signal processor subsystem
to control the traction motor torque.
e. Braking Control Subsystem. The braking control subsystem
contains actuators and drive electronics necessary to apply the hydraulically
actuated service brakes in accordance with signals generated by the
signal processor subsystem.
f. Vehicle Chassis SubsystEgm_. The vehicle chassis subsystem
consists of the basic chassis, body, suspension, braking system, pro-
pulsion (drive motor and battery), and other components that are normally
a part of a conventional manually-controlled or AGT electric vehicle.
g. "Passenger Interface" Subsystem. The passenger interface
subsystem consists of safety and operations related devices necessary
to permit AMTV operations with passengers. Items such as passenger
stop switches, emergency stop buttons, automatic door operations, boarding
threshold switches, seat switches, etc., are included.
2.	 Stationary Subsystems
a. Route ,Subsystem. The route subsystem includes the guidewire
installation, electric exciters, signalling system for routine stops and
turns or curves and traffic separators (fence, curb or painted lines).
b. Intersection CouRling Subsystem. The intersection coupling
subsystem includes all mechanisms involved in safely meshing AMTVs
with pedestrian and other vehicular traffic at intersections. Stop
signs, traffic signal timing modification devices, signal-to-guidewire
couplers and errant vehicle detectors (to sense possible traffic signal
violators) are mechanisms that might be used singly or in combination
at intersections.
C.	 Passenger Stop Subsystem. The passenger stations may include
sign posts, marked boarding lanes, benches, overhead cover or call
buttons to signal the AMTV system that passengers are waiting to board,
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d. Maintenance and Storage Subsystem. The maintenance and
storage garage consists of a protected facility with proper equipment
for off-line storage, repair, and routine maintenance of vehicles.
e. Dispatchin¢ and Fault Detection Subsystem. The monitoring
and fault detection subsystem includes equipment for monitoring system
operation, and for detecting and responding to system breakdowns.
Included also are fault recovery and emergency response procedures.
The dispatching subsystem consists of equipment for automatic control
of vehicle schedules, route spacing and load factors.
f. Check-out Subsystem. Consists of equipment and procedures
to confirm the correct functioning of system hardware before putting
an AMTV into daily service.
D.	 SUBSYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS
This section outlines the design requirements for the above
subsystems, and gives some important numerical parameters involved in
their design.
1.	 Vehicle Subsystems
a.	 headway Sensing. Although a number of other sensing concepts
are possible, optical sensors have been used on the JPL AMTV for headway
sensing. Their capability can be extended for use in a 7/20 mph hybrid
vehicle and the system can be simplified for use in a 1-112 mph AMTV. A
7 mph vehicle requires primary (25 ft) and secondary (8 ft) sensors. For
a 1-112 mph AMTV, secondary sensors alone are sufficient. The sensing
range of a 7/20 mph hybrid vehicle must extend to 125 ft, necessitating
a third set of sensors, called the long range sensors.
The diagram of Figure 3-2 illustrates ideal sensing patterns
for each of the sensor elements. The rectangular areas shown in the
figure for each sensor element indicate the area within which the sensor
must detect an obstacle. Acceptable margins for each area are also
indicated. The actual individual detector beam areas are elliptical,
so design compromises must be made to approach the ideal field pattern.
Further discussions of long-range sensor characteristics, beam definition
and sensor articulation for extended lateral coverage in curves are
contained in Section IV.
The one-foot lateral margin requirement (AW) shown in Figure 3-2
is defined such that the sensing system must detect low reflectivity
target from one foot left of the vehicle to one foot right of the vehicle,
and be insensitive, or blind, to retroreflective surface which is at
least two feet away from either side of the! vehicle.
The headway sensor also has longitudinal margin requirements. The
detection window for the primary system is defined such that low reflect-
ivity target within 25 feet must be detected and retroreflective target
more than 40 feet away must ngt be detected. For the secondary
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Figure 3-2. Optical Headway Sensor Coverage Diagram
headway sensing system, the detector must respond to a low reflectivity
target within 8 feet and must = respond to a specular or retroreflective
target more than 12 feet away. The corresponding figures for the long-
range sensor are 125 ft and 200 ft.
A contact-bumper switch will activate the emergency braking system
on contact to perform a locked-wheel stop. Such a braking system will
stop a 7 mph vehicle within three feet on dry surface, and a 20 mph
vehicle within 18 ft. It is possible, by means of 'a cats-whisker type
switch extending in front of the vehicle, to perform an emergency stop
without colliding with the obstacle at speeds up to 7 mph. A design
trade-off which should receive further attention involves the choice
between a cats-whisker type emergency contact switch, and a well-padded
physical bumper design into which the contact switch is incorporated.
The padded bumper-switch option is the only practical approach for a 20 mph
system. Although a locked-wheel stop is undesirable, there appears
to be no other acceptable strategy in the event that an obstacle contacts
the front of a moving AMTV.
The headway sensing system design must contain fail-safe or
self-check features. Failure of the system should cause the vehicle
to make a controlled stop.
b. Steering. The cable-following steering technique has been
demonstrated at higher speeds on larger vehicles than are anticipated
for AMTV applications (see Refs. 4 and 5). The vehicle should respond
to a lateral error signal within acceptable steady-state displacement
error bounds, and without excessive overshoot or hunting character-
istics. The route curvature radii should be made as large as possible
and standardized where practicable, to optimize headway sensor function
in a curve. Vehicle speed within a turn or curve should be limited
to prevent nominal lateral accelerations in excess of 0.05 g in order
to avoid discomfort to passengers in the event that the guidewire instal-
lation is inaccurate. The guidewire should be placed within approximately
1/2 inch of the true line, and transition radii can be helpful at the
entrance to curves, even at 7 mph.
c. Control Louie. The function of the control logic is to
accept and process all vehicle sensor and manual override signals and
to deliver appropriate commands to the vehicle drive-motor controller
and brakes.
The basic functions of the control logic are listed in Table 3-2.
Lower numbered inputs take precedence in case of more than one input.
In addition to the automatic functions shown in the table, the control
logic is required to perform function switching from automatic to manual
mode operation if any manual override command is made. The table illus-
trates that each of the inputs may originate from more than one source.
The table defines the overall control logic function for a 7/20 mph
hybrid AMTV_. Logic functions for a 7 mph AMTV or for a 1-1/2 mph vehicle
are given by an appropriate subset of the total list. Specifically,
a 7 mph AMTV requires only the first 4 commands, plus the seventh.
z
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Table 3-2. General Control Logic Functions for an AMTV
Command	 Source	 Function
1. Panic Stop A. Red buttons
	
	
Apply full brakes and hold.
Auto mode input cancels.
B. Contact bumper
2. Stop	 A. Secondary sensor 	 Slow to stop at controlled
rate and hold
B. Loss of cable
C. Passenger Stop
3. Timed Stop Programmed stops Slow to stop at controlled
rate - pause for passenger
boarding
4. Slow - 2	 A. Primary sensor	 Accelerate or decelerate
at controlled rate to 2 mph
+	 and hold speed.
B. Steering angle
input
C. Road-fixed speed
r	 zone signal
5. Cruise - 7 A. Long-range sensor Accelerate or decelerate
at controlled rate to 7 mph and
hold speed
B. Road-fixed speed-
zone signal
b. Cruise - 20 Enabling road-fixed 	 Accelerate at controlled
sensor input
	
rate to 20 mph speed
7. Auto	 A. Auto mode key	 Activates logic; accelerate
switch	 at controlled rate to 7 mph
and hold speed
B. Steering acquisi-
tion signal (both
inputs required)
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A 1-1/2 mph vehicle only needs the first three commands, and the seventh,
which now causes the vehicle to cruise at 1-1/2 mph.
The control logic subsystem also determines the acceleration
and deceleration rates and the rate of change of acceleration (jerk)
which are transmitted as commands to the drive motor controller.
These rates are a compromise, chosen to ensure a safe stopping distance
and to minimize discomfort to the passengers. Since standing passengers
might be permitted, the rates must be consistent with common practice
in other transit vehicles that allow standing passengers. Typical
rates for other transit systems are given in Table 3-3. Although the
possibility of using higher rates has been discussed, published data
are insufficient to make a conclusive suggestion (Ref. 14a).
Table 3-3. Typical Acceleration/Deceleration and Jerk
Specifications for Other Transit Systems
Max. Normal	 Max.	 Normal
Vehicle	 Longitudinal	 Emergency	 Longitudinal	 Emergency
Acc/Decel.	 Deceleration	 Jerk	 Jerk
g f/s2 g f/s2	 g/s	 f/63	 g/s	 f/s3
Morgantown	 .137 4.5 .330 10.5	 .130	 4.2	 .320	 10.5
AIRTRANS	 .116 3.8 .780 9.0	 .080	 2.5	 -	 -
BART	 .152 4.8 .152 4.8	 -	 -	 -	 -
Based on the values given in Table 3-3 the longitudinal acceleration,
and jerk rates suggested for an AMTV are as follows:
(1) Normal Accel./Decel. . . . 	 . . 0.16 g or 5 fps2
(2) Emergency Deceleration . . . . . 0.33 g or 10.5 fps2
(3) Normal Jerk .	 . . . . .	 . . 0.16 g/s or 5 fps3
(4) Emergency Jerk . . . . . . . 	 . 0.33 g/s or 10.5 fps3
Here, the term "emergency" applies to a stop commanded by the control
logic (a more complex logic than given in Table 3-1), in response to
an abnormal sensor input. The contact bumper would command an
instantaneous locked-wheel stop.
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Stopping distance as a function of the acceleration and jerk
rate chosen are given in Appendix C. Stopping distance from a constant
speed, and a worst case stopping distance, which occurs with the vehicle
still accelerating but nearly at the maximum speed, are given in
Figure C-1.
d. Drive Motor Controls. The drive motor current is regu-
lated to control vehicle acceleration and slow down the vehicle
before hydraulic braking is applied (dynamic or regenerative braking).
Motor overcurrent and overspeed protection should also be provided.
The sensors for these protective circuits should be separate from those
used in the main control system to provide backup protection in the
event that a failure in the motor armature or field, or a failure in
speed control circuitry occurs.
e. Braking. While dynamic braking provides redundancy, and can
even be programmed to absorb most of the energy, friction brakes are the
primary braking system.
The friction braking system must be designed in a fail-safe manner
such that with loss of on-board power, the brakes will operate automat-
ically to bring the vehicle to a safe stop. Spring-applied, power
released parking brakes can provide this backup function. The brake
controller should employ redundant systems with a dual master brake
cylinder as in passenger automobiles. The integrity of each system
and the switchover function should be tested daily as part of the vehicle
checkout. The braking system should also contain an automatic anti-
rollback function. Since no AMTV installation will require vehicle backing
while the vehicle is in service, the anti-rollback function will be
operative at all times in the auto mode.
f. Vehicle Chassis. The principal vehicle configurational
and safety features were discussed above as part of the system require-
ments. Other operational requirements are listed below.
(1) M& - Overhead protection should be provided on any AMTV
that does not operate exclusively indoors. A hard roof
is preferred, but a cloth canopy type roof may be acceptable
for tram type vehicles.
(2) Interior Liahtiniz - Interior lighting should be provided as
appropriate to the application.
(3) Ride Quality - The ride quality of an AMTV should be
consistent with those of a conventional low speed transit
vehicle.
(4) Interior Noise and Vibration - Interior noise and vibration
levels should be consistent with standards of conventional
transit vehicles.
(5) Cleaning and Maintenance - Interior and exterior surfaces
of the vehicle should be clean in design and constructed of
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durable waterproof materials to permit rapid and frequent
cleaning by maintenance personnel. Equipment compartments
should be easily accessible for service and repair.
(6)	 Q12erational Range - The vehicle should operate continuously
without battery recharge for at least four hours of service.
Greater endurance is desirable, depending on application.
A battery charge state instrument should be installed in a
visible location to indicate to operating personnel when
battery recharge is required. Depending on the economics
of the application, it may be desirable to include battery-
pack quick-change provisions in the design of the vehicle.
Alternatively, where combustion fumes or added power plant
noise can be tolerated, a hybrid powerplant (battery and
heat engine in combination) may be installed.
g.	 Passenger Interface System
(1) Seating Configuration - Seating for enclosed vehicles should
face forward or to the interior. Aisles should be of sufficient
width to allow at least one passenger to move freely to or
from the entrance doors. Seating for open tram type vehicles
for 1-1/2, and in some cases, 7 mph AMTVs may face forward
or to the outside.
(2) Doors - Folding or sliding type doors are appropriate for
enclosed vehicles. Doors should be placed on one or both
sides of the vehicle depending on the application, and
should be wide enough to permit free passage. It may be
desirable to have several doors, one per seat, for rapid
boarding. Doors should fit flush to the exterior of the
vehicle or be faired at the leading and trailing edges
to minimize injury to a pedestrian who may be standing
too close to a moving vehicle. Door handles, if used, should
be flush and of a design which will avoid entrapping the
hand of a boarding passenger if, for any reason, the vehicle
moves before boarding is completed. Release switches might
be placed on the closing edges of doors to open the door in
the event a small object is caught as the door closes. An
inhibit switch will prevent the vehicle from moving until
all doors are completely closed. All doors will remain
locked while the vehicle is in motion.
(3) Interior and Exterior Signing - Emergency instructions should
be provided on an interior placard, as well as cautionary
signs (i.e.,  "No Smoking," "Watch Step," etc.) and route
information signs. Exterior signs should be limited to
route designations and any boarding instructions that may
be necessary (i.e., "Entrance," "Exit," etc.).
(4) Front and Side Bumpers - Pedestrian Protection - All AMTVs
should have soft bumpers equipped with emergency switches
at the front and sides of the vehicle. The front should
be designed to provide a smooth padded bumper effect that
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will deflect pedestrians or small fixed objects to the
side with minimum probability of injury. The sides of
the vehicle should be clean and free of protuberances.
(5) Sounding Sianal - An audible signal may be sounded to warn
pedestrians of an approaching AMTV. The signal may be
sounded continuously or be triggered by vehicle headway
sensors. The signal should not be harsh in character or
excessively loud.
2.	 Stationary Subsystems
The stationary subsystems include the guidewire system, right-of-way
protection, intersection control, curve and turn control, stop control,
operational monitoring and fault control, and scheduling control subsystems,
plus the associated checkout and maintenance functions necessary for
assuring reliable and safe operation of the AMTV.
a	 Route Subsystem
1) Right-of-Way Guard Fencing. The right-of-way of 7/20 mph
hybrid AMTV systems will be protected on the street side of 20 mph sections
by a low protective rail or curb strong enough to physically deflect an
automobile in a glancing impact. Fencing will be required on the sidewalk
side of the right-of-way to prevent pedestrians and small animals from
straying into the right-of-way area. At intersections, the right-of-
way will be marked on the pavement but will otherwise be unprotected.
For 1-1/2 mph and 7 mph AMTVs the right-of-way will be marked on the
pavement but fences will not be required to prevent entry into the
right-of-way.
2) Lateral Control. The steering system reference for AMTVs is
provided by an uninterrupted buried wire cable or a train of emplaced
markers located nominally along the center of the right-of-way throughout
the entire route. Suitable pickups on the vehicle will detect lateral
deviations of the vehicle from the center of the right-of-way and provide
corrective signals to the steering system. Any interruptions in the
cable or train of markers should cause the vehicle steering system to hold
steering angle while the braking system makes a programmed stop.
The vehicle sensor for the acquisition signal should be care-
fully designed to accept a definite lateral excursion by the vehicle,
(—t8 in.). Road fixed marker signals must function correctly over
a.wider excursion. Lateral clearance between the AMTV path and any
curbs or fixed structures alongside it must accommodate the same lateral
excursion, although a properly functioning AMTV will track the wire
within a much closer tolerance (--f 1 in). If a spur or switching point
is included in the route, techniques for switching must be incorporated,
for example each spur will be coded or only the proper sidetrack guidewire
will be excited - the unwanted sidetrack guidewire excitation will be
removed either manually or automatically. Existing technology used
in warehousing systems is applicable.
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3)	 Longitudinal Control. Provisions must be made for trans-
mitting speed zone, turn anticipation and stop commands from the roadway
to the vehicle. These commands will signal the entrances and exits
of curves where speed must be reduced and will identify passenger pickup
points and stop signs for traffic control. These types of signals
will be time invariant, as opposed to route or spur switching and
traffic control signals which vary with time and will be handled by other
means.
b.	 Intersection Coupling. Time varying signals which are
coupled to the traffic signals must be transmitted from the roadway
to the AMTV. Whether the AMTV preempts other vehicular traffic at inter-
sections or not, the AMTV and normal traffic signalling system must
be integrated and interlocked in such a way that adequate stopping
distance is provided to the AMTV and that at no time can an AMTV and
cross traffic be admitted to the intersection at the same time. Turning
traffic will not be permitted during the AMTV crossing periods at
intersections. Where stop sign intersection control is used, four-
way stop signs are needed. The AMTV will then respond to the intersec-
tion as it does to a programmed passenger stop; stopping for a fixed
period of time, and then proceeding. In the event that the AMTV route
itself includes crossings, switch points and merging, appropriate coupling
for speed control must be incorporated to permit safe crossing and
merging.
C.	 Passenger Stations. Because boarding areas for 7/20 mph
hybrid AMTVs could possibly be located in a 20 mph section of the route,
special protective measures must be taken to prevent entrance to the
guideway by animals or small children, since the normal semi-guideway
protective fencing must be removed to permit boarding. For 7 mph or
1-1/2 mph AMTV systems, boarding areas should be clearly marked with
boarding call switches mounted on posts for systems which do not automat-
ically stop at all boarding stations. Consideration may also be given
to overhead protection and lighting at boarding stations.
d. Maintenance Areas and Storage Garage. A garage area must be
provided for storage of vehicles not in service. Facilities for routine
maintenance should be housed in conjunction with the garage; where necessary
spare part inventories consistent with the level of field repair will
also be stored. System maintenance and operations personnel will be
headquartered at the garage area which may serve also as the operations
center.
e. Disng and Fault Detection. Provision should be made
to maintain a consistent level of service at all times by monitoring
spacing of AMTVs on the route continuously and automatically. If bunching
of vehicles occurs, this condition should be detected and corrected by
selectively delaying vehicles at a central dispatching station. Means
must be provided to signal operating personnel about the occurrence
of an anomaly on the system. In a simple system, monitoring of the
time between vehicles at a central stop may suffice. In more sophisticated
systems, some form of communication system may be required.
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f.	 Checkout Provisions. Each AMTV must be checked out daily
before entering service. Special attention will be given to safety
related items such as headway sensors, steering, and braking systems.
Some of the vehicle checkout may be performed automatically using on-
board vehicle self-check features built into microprocessor control
logic. Additional functional checks may require dynamic tests of the
braking and steering systems using fixtures or test stands installed
at the garage. The function of redundant switchover systems in the
vehicle must be individually checked to ensure that all multiple redun-
dant paths of critical systems are operable and that the switchover
logic properly detects and performs the switching function in the event
of an in-service failure.
Tests of the stationary system elements should also be performed on
a daily basis. To perform this checkout, it is expected that maintenance
personnel will drive an AMTV through the route exercising each signal
and observing each speedup and slowdown function in accordance with a
procedure developed for the particular installation.
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SECTION IV
REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to examine the technology required
for the AMTV, and to identify those areas which need further development
in order to achieve a fully operational AMTV system. The discussion
follows the AMTV system description outlined in Section III. Performance
of the present AMTV mechanization is compared to the requirements set
forth there where possible, and approaches toward making the desired
improvements are recommended.
The conclusions have been derived partly from the JPL AMTV Phase I
experiment conducted during February through June of 1976 (see Ref. 1).
Extrapolations related to the 20 mph mode and other refinements which
were not a part of the earlier experiment have been made.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INITIAL APPLICATION
Efforts needed for implementation of a near-term demonstration
are listed below.
(1)
	
	 Optical Headway Sensor Performance Improvement - The performance
of the optical headway sensors should be made to conform
with the specifications given in Section III. Improvements
in beam definition and response time constant are required.
(2) Sensor Beam Pointing Control - Provision for directing the
sensor beam in the direction of a turn is needed.	 This cap-
ability must be provided in a way that is commensurate with
the requirements of the route. 	 For example, a simple straight-
{
ahead route with U-turns performed in an area separated
from other traffic would not require additional sensor capability.
In general, provision must be made for sensing in a standardized
long radius curve and in a U-turn.
(3) per and Emergency Stop Switch Combination - The bumper must
provide the dual function of protecting the AMTV in the
event of a failure of the optical sensor system, and
minimizing the risk of injury to a pedestrian under the
same circumstances.
	 Some form of emergency stop-on-contact
capability must be provided over the entire frontal area
of the vehicle, (including windshield area) and also along
the sides for protection during a turn.
(4) Fail-Safe Design - It is important that an operational a
AMTV, even in the early demonstration stages, be made as
reliable as possible.	 Further, its design should be
fail-safe, either by inherent design or by the application
of redundancy in critical components.
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(5) Microprocessor Based ' Control Logic - Although it is not a
significant cost driver, the flexibility and added
capability of a microprocessor control and logic system
will be a valuable asset to a developmental system.
(6) Safety Measures fgr Passenger Boarding - Doors or a
perimeter sensing system must be provided to inhibit the
vehicle from starting while passengers are in the process
of boarding or leaving the AMTV.
(7) Safety and Fault Recovery Plan - A general Safety and Fault
Recovery guideline must be developed for typical
applications as well.as unique procedures for specific
applications.
(8) Vehicle Qperational Range - If battery powered vehicles are
r
	
	 used (an attractive alternative for environmental reasons),
provisions must be made for simple and rapid change of
battery modules, appropriate.to the specific application.
C.	 STATUS OF AMTV TECHNOLOGY
The required performance of each subsystem element, and approaches
for achieving it are discussed below in further detail. Required per-
formance is discussed with reference to the examples of applications
illustrated in Section II-F. The items discussed are summarized in
Table 4-1. An estimate of where each task falls along the line between
straight-forward engineering and long-range research is given in the
columns labelled "Type of Effort". Here, the term "Engineering" implies
that there is some applicable experience, "Development" implies that
the approach appears to be fairly straight-forward, but involves some
new advances, and "R&D" implies that basically new technology is needed,
and it is not clear what the best approach is to solving the problem.
The columns labelled "Need" identify which of the two described applications
require the results of the task, or whether the task is aimed at an
increase in system capability.
1.	 Headway Sensing System
Headway sensing is a key element of an AMTV, and refinement of
this system should receive top priority in future hardware development.
The headway sensing system has a_number of independently functioning
parts which together protect the AMTV from collision. A set of optical
sensors provide overlapping coverage for basic straight-ahead collision
avoidance. A separate : set is required for protection during a U-turn
maneuver, Both are backed up by a combination compliant bumper and
contact switch.
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Table 4-1.
	 Listing of Needed AMTV Technology Developments
Type of
Subsystem, Item Need Effort
r.
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A. VEHICLE
1. Headway Sensors
t
a)	 Long-range sensor X X
b)	 Response time X X
c)	 Noise optimization X X
d)	 Beam definition X X
e)	 Vertical extension
of coverage X X
f)	 Turn coupling X X
g)	 U-turn sensing X X
h)	 Contact bumper design X X
i)	 Contact bumper vertical
extension X X
2. Steering
3• Control logic
a)	 Microprocessor
_	 implementation X X
4. Drive Motor Control
a)	 Reduce time constant X X
Table 4-1. Listing of Needed AMTV Technology Developments
(Continuation 1)
Subsystem, Item
5. Braking
a) 4 wheel proportional
b) Parking brake
6. Vehicle chassis
a) 8-12 hr. endurance
7. Passenger Interface
a) Early Startup
Protection
b) Audible signals
B. FIXED ELEMENTS
1. Route
Discrete marker study
Guide wire installation
automation
2. Intersection Coupling
a. Design
b. Right turn capability
c. Left turn capability
Type of
Need Effort
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Table 4-1. Listing of Needed AMTV Technology Developments
(Continuation 2)
Type of
Subsystem, Item	 Need	 Effort
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d.	 Protection against
signal violation X X
e.	 Guideway intrusion
protection X X
3. Vehicle checkout
a.	 Implement X X
4. Scheduling X" X
5. Monitoring, Fault recovery,
accident plan X X
6. Maintenance and storage X X
C. OTHER ITEMS
1. Fail safe and
reliable design	 X	 X
2. Long-Term Technology
development
1
a. Headway sensor
alternatives	 X	 X
r	 b. Automated passing
I	 capability	 X	 X
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In the JPL AMTV, the basic sensors are optical devices, consisting
of an array of four primary (25 ft) sensors, which together generate
a beam about 6 in. thick vertically and somewhat wider than the vehicle,
and two similar but smaller fan beam secondary (8 ft) sensors. These
are simple fixed devices without scanning elements or precision optics
(see Refs. 6 and 7). Although the present sensing performance has been
adequate for the breadboard feasibility demonstration, it would not
be adequate in an operational situation. The signal-to-noise ratio
for a black target is marginal, and the interrelated time constant
of the sensor outputs ( 1/2 sec) is excessive. Beam definition, both
laterally and down-track, also needs improvement.
Fabrication and evaluation of an improved set of sensors is
planned. This set is an array of 7 sensor elements, each element
performing both the primary and secondary sensor function. One element
of this set has been built and tested in the laboratory. Its beam
definition has been found to be satisfactory and sufficient signal
to noise ratio to obtain a 0.1 sec time response has been obtained.
Evaluation of this system will continue with tests on the present vehicle.
Additional specific developments which must be made to improve
the various sensors are described below.
a.	 Long Range (20 mph) Sensor. Sensing elements to detect
vehicles or other large objects at a distance of 125 ft must be developed
for vehicle operation at 20 mph. Since no past work has been specifically
aimed at these requirements, this is a new development task. Light source
power constraints will limit the capability to detect small black targets
using an extension of the present primary sensor approach. However,
reliable detection of other AMTVs or automobiles in a semi-guideway is
straightforward. Therefore, reasonable performance goals for a development
task are to achieve;
(1) Reliable detection and emergency stop for a pedestrian or
similar size object in a guideway.
(2) Reliable detection for a programmed stop (normal deceleration)
for another AMTV or automobile in the guideway.
In this context, emergency stop means to stop the vehicle using
maximum braking effort. Stopping in this mode would be an abnormal
event because the guideway security will have been violated to necessitate
the stop.
Other improvements required in order to achieve these goals are,
optimized signal-to-noise design of the sensors, and improved optical
design for beam definition at 125 ft range.
b.	 Primary Sensors. The primary sensors carry the main headway
sensing burden. They must operate without the degree of control over
the operational environment that can be provided by the 20 mph semi
guideway. Except forthe different range requirements, the two sensor
types are functionally equivalent. They must detect any object in
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the path of the vehicle large enough to be a hazard to the vehicle, or a
pedestrian or another vehicle.
The following items should receive attention. The specific ideas
presented apply to both the primary and the long-range (20 mph) sensor
systems.
(1) Detector Noise and Response Time Optimization - Detection of a
black target at 25 ft and discrimination against a distant,
fully sunlit, white background are conflicting requirements.
Optimization of the detector channel for best SIN performance is
needed. Detector response time is inherently coupled with
noise, and should be considered as a part of the tradeoff. It
is felt that a detector response time of 0.1 sec is necessary to
obtain an overall vehicle response time of 0.2 see, e.g., a
value which approximates the expected response time of a human
driver.
(2) Beam Definition - The headway sensors must detect any object in
an area approximately 1 ft wider than the vehicle on each side.
The sensed area must be precisely defined laterally to permit
unimpeded passing of parked cars. The need for good beam
definition arises because of the extreme difference in
reflectivity between a black diffuse target and a
retroreflective lens such as an automobile tail-light or
reflector. The sensor beam will always be larger for
retroreflective targets, because much more light is returned to
the detector by a retroreflector.
Two approaches are possible for achieving the required beam
definition. The one to-be investigated next involves the use
of an array of several sensing elements, each one a narrow
well defined ( 6 in. laterally) beam. The other involves the
development of special (perhaps aspheric) optics designed to
cover the required area with one or two sensor packages.
A cost tradeoff exists between the two approaches
which should ultimately be examined. It involves the use
of more costly optics in the one case versus a multitude
of simple sensing elements in the other.
(3) Vertical Extension of Headway Sensing Area - The present
sensors cover only a plane near the road surface ( 1 ft
high). Ultimately, either extension to cover the total height
of the vehicle will be needed, or because the probability of
encountering an overhead obstacle is low, such an occurrence
may be treated as an emergency stop situation covered by
a bumper switch.
(4) Sensor PQinting During Turns - The most frequently encountered
shortcoming of the simple straight-ahead sensor beam of the
breadboard AMTV involved lateral coverage during turns.
With a sensor beam 1 ft wider than the vehicle, and extending
25 ft ahead, calculations indicate that a turn with a radius
of curvature of 300 ft or less will compromise the headway
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Protection on the inside of the turn. Either coupling of
the sensor beam with steering angle, or some means of switching
in or out special sensor elements directed at a slight angle
to the vehicle centerline are possible solutions. In addition,
a means to signal the vehicle in advance of a turn appears
to be needed, not only for lateral sensor coverage, but
possibly also for speed control. In developing a simple
mechanization of turn-coupled headway sensing, it will
be advantageous to limit route turn radii to one or a few
standardized values.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the order of magnitude of path
curvature allowable for a straight-ahead sensor pattern
which is wider by distance AW on each side than the vehicle.
The curves are computed for different values of OW, and relate
curve radius R to the distance D from the front of the AMTV
to an obstacle on the inside of the turn in a position that
would just be grazed by the vehicle, when it would first
be detected by the sensor. The curves can be interpreted
as giving the minimum turn radius that will not compromise
the straight-ahead sensor, as a function of sensor range.
Note that the typical radii are much longer than the minimum
radius of curvature permitted by lateral acceleration (60 ft
at 7 mph for an 0.05 g lateral acceleration).
C.	 Secondary Sensors. Except for beam definition, the secondary
sensors used on the JPL experimental vehicle provided satisfactory
performance.
In addition to the straight-ahead sensing requirement, the secondary
sensing system of an operational AMTV must also provide warning of collision
during a minimum radius turn (U-turn), a function not incorporated
in the JPL experimental AMTV. Such a turn is performed at low speed,
and is a separate problem from the cruise-speed turn problem discussed.
above. In a U-turn, the velocity vector of the front of the vehicle
is rotated by an angle of 45 deg or more with respect to the centerline.
Suitable short range sensors looking to the side, (and even toward the
rear for passing traffic) are needed and can be incorporated as part of
the secondary sensing channel. These can be activated by steering angle,
but road-fixed signals to anticipate the U-turn may also be desirable.
d.	 Contact Bumper Switch. The final element of the headway
sensing system is a mechanical switch-bumper combination which applies
maximum braking if actuated by contact with an obstacle. A fiberglass
"Whisker-pole" arrangement was used in the JPL experimental AMTV to
provide the switch function only. However, it is desirable to actuate
she switch in conjunction with a compliant but durable bumper structure
to provide both pedestrian as well as passenger protection in the event
of a collision.
The contact switch function must also be extended to cover the full
height of the vehicle in the event of an overhanging obstacle, perhaps
by a combination of the switch mechanism with a replaceable windshield.
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e.	 Long-Term Develoomentp. Although an infrared proximity
sensor has been used for the headway sensing function, other approaches
should also be evaluated. The development of a sensing device that
can reach to 125 ft, return position and velocity data for the closest
target, and also scan a swath to either side of the vehicle is technically
feasible, although much too costly at the present time to permit use
on an AMTV. Development of this type of capability, in a simple, low-
cost device is a reasonable expectation from today's rapidly developing
electronic technology, and would permit raising the cruise speed of
an AMTV from the present 7 mph while relaxing the requirement for complete
guideway protection.
2. Steering System
The hydraulic steering servo used on the JPL experimental AMTV
is of conventional design and has proven to be precise and reliable.
Its design is described in Reference 18. Little improvement appears
to be required except to enhance its reliability by the application
of fail-safe design principles.
3. Control Logic
The present hard-wired controller processes a number of discrete
on-off inputs while producing smoothly varying speed signals for drive
motor and braking control. A fixed parameter ramp generator supplies
the speed profile program and passive networks limit the rate of change
of acceleration/deceleration (jerk) commands. While its performance is
satisfactory, logic modifications or changes in parameters have been
awkward to make.
Development of a microprocessor controller is a desirable future
task to provide greater control flexibility, added sensor signal
processing capability, internal redundancy and self-check ability, and
an ease of function modification which will be of particular benefit
during the development and evaluation of the vehicle. Also, the micro-
processor will provide added capability, for example, to select differing
deceleration profiles depending on target distance and closure rates
as indicated by times of switching between high-speed, primary and
secondary sensor channels. Individual vehicles could also be programmed
to follow different routes using a coded road fixed signal rather than
requiring roadside equipment to effect switching between routes. The
microprocessor can be useful in automating prestart checkout procedures,
and can be used for certain housekeeping functions such as route loading
(based on seat occupancy count), battery state of charge monitoring,
etc. The microprocessor can supervise on-board redundant systems and
provide switchover signals in the event a failure is detected.
4. Drive Motor Control
The present JPL experimental AMTV is equipped with an SCR controller
which provides both traction motor control and dynamic braking. Switching
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between forward power and braking involves inherent delays in the present
controller, which can be as great as 1/2 sec. Either separate modulatable
hydraulic service brakes should be used with dynamic braking reserved only
for redundant use, or an improved controller design is needed. This task
involves straight-forward engineering and should take advantage of
existing designs wherever possible.
5. Hydraulic Service Brakes
Hydraulically actuated mechanical service brakes are required,
either as the primary braking system or alternatively, as a dynamic
braking backup system and for a holding brake. A four wheel modulatable
service braking system is needed. Proportional control can provide a
smooth transition between dynamic and friction braking while the vehicle
is brought to a full stop, yet still permit instantaneous application
of all wheel brakes for an emergency stop.
As a part of the braking system, spring applied, power released
parking brakes must also be incorporated to protect against internal
power failure due to battery depletion or malfunction. Many of the
required braking system features are common to other automated guideway
transit systems but will require careful engineering and performance
verification. Maximum use should be made of technology from other
automated vehicle systems.
6. Vehicle Powerplant
The JPL AMTV is battery powered, which provides excellent control-
lability but limited range. Ideally, an AMTV should operate continuously
over a full day without any refuelling, recharging or other service.
Increasing the number of batteries will provide marginal range performance
for a 7 mph AMTV but is likely to be insufficient for a 7/20 mph hybrid
AMTV. Alternatives include the following:
(1) A short mid-shift or mid-day high-rate recharge in which
the vehicle is removed from service for an hour or two
during a slack load period.
(2) Battery exchange using quick change mechanisms and
special garage handling systems to permit a one-man rapid
battery pack exchange.
(3) A heat engine-battery hybrid vehicle in which the heat
engine provides all sustaining energy.
(4) A heat engine only powerplant which requires refuelling
only and can easily operate over a full day without attention.
All of the alternatives suffer limitations. A mid-shift recharge
service procedure will 4-equire significant maintenance personnel time
	 I
to servicea large fleet of vehicles. A battery exchange system to
accomplish the same purpose will require a large inventory of batteries i
to supply the fleet with quick replacements. A hybrid power plant provides
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an attractive alternative in that it possesses the controllability
features of the all electric vehicle with the range performance of
a heat engine only vehicle. Both the heat engine-only and hybrid power
plants suffer the drawbacks associated with pollutant emissions and
flammable fuels.
Considerable work on electric and hybrid vehicles throughout
the country is being sponsor--d by the Department of Energy, and many
of the results should be applicable to an AMTV.
7.	 Passenger Interfaces
Means for preventing the AMTV from starting up before passengers
are clear of the doors or entrances need to be developed. On a closed
vehicle, the doors with their associated protective systems provide
this function.
In an open vehicle, protective systems must not only ensure that
the boarding process is complete, but that limbs and packages are within
the perimeter of the vehicle. An additional beam-break type of perimeter
sensor coupled to the secondary sensor channel should be investigated
as a solution to the passenger containment problem in tram type vehicles.
Audible signaling devices also may play a part in assuring that
passengers are prepared for automatic vehicle startup and that pedestrians
are provided with an audible warning of an approaching vehicle. A
tone preceding startup and possibly another type of tone, musical rather
than a warning horn, to indicate the presence of an AMTV to pedestrians
should be investigated for these purposes. In general, such devices
must be tested in an operational environment to evaluate their effectiveness.
D.	 STATIONARY SYSTEM ELEMENTS
While many of the stationary systems required for AMTV operation
have parallels in other transit system concepts, their use in an AMTV
system is a primary function in contrast to the backup function they
typically provide in driver-controlled systems.
1.	 System and Route Design
While route layout will usually be dictated by the constraints of
particular applications, some general procedures should be developed for
the design and to establish both the economic and practical feasibility
of AMTV installations. Included in these should be considerations of,
(1) Geographical variation of passenger demand within service
area.
(2) Unique hazards related to the operational environment,
(i.e., weather) fault recovery provisions, and fencing
and curbing requirements.
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(3) Maintenance garage and operational personnel requirements.
(4) Number of boarding areas needed and facilities required at
each boarding point.
(5) AMTV related intersection control and route turn or
switching limitations.
(6) Minimum curve radii, allowable curve speeds and curve radii
standardization.
(7) System installation and operational costs.
2. Guide Cable Installation
The wire following steering technology has been proven through
numerous applications, and its use on early AMTV systems is highly
probable. Limitations of guide wire installations include placement
over reinforcing bar, buried or surface rail tracks, manhole covers and
drainage gratings. These can normally be avoided by the design of the
route, removal or relocation of metallic objects, aided by the use of
• phase sensitive wire following technique. Amore severe hazard to
• guide wire installation is ground motion which can result in cable
breakage. Early demonstration system installations should be located
in areas where frequent ground freezing does not occur to minimize
the risk of wire breakage due to this cause.
The speed and accuracy of the cable installation could be
significantly improved by development of equipment and procedures to
mark the road surface rapidly and accurately for saw cutting, perhaps
using a manually dv iven AMTV; and development of a specialized device
or tool to apply baekfill material.
In addition, further work is needed to integrate longitudinal con-
trol information with the lateral guide cable either through individually
excited sections of cable or by coded markers placed on the road surface
at the time of cable installation. An initial study is underway at
JPL to investigate an alternate method of providing steering references
by using discrete markers placed at regular intervals in the road surface.
In this approach, certain types of longitudinal control information
could be integrated with the lateral reference by the use of coding
in the placement of the markers. The results of this study will be
described in a separate report.
3. Longitudinal Control
Individual sections of an AMTV route must convey slowdown,
speedup and programmed stop signals to the AMTV. On-board equipment
will detect the presence of longitudinal control information and
activate the motor-controller. At boarding points and signal controlled
intersections, the on-board sensing systems will command computed
deceleration profiles based on fixed markers which will bring the AMTV to
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a near stop, after which it might continue to creep at a very low speed
until final stopping is accomplished by another marker signal.
Proper vehicle speed information for individual sections of the
route can be provided by road-fixed coded markers or by changes in
excitation frequency or modulation of the cable. For example, when
a "go" signal is received from an intersection traffic control signal,
either the cable frequency or modulation of the intersection entrance
section might be changed to provide the speed command through and beyond
the intersection. Redundant information could be provided by coded
markers.
4. Intersection Coupling
Development of effective means of coupling the AMTV system with
traffic signals will be necessary. To date, no work has been done
on this subject. Two modes are envisioned; (1) AMTV travel through a
signal controlled intersection can be adapted to a conventional fixed
timing sequence or, (2) the AMTV may exert priority control over the
normal signal timing system. In either cas(,, there must be an electrical
interface between the traffic control signal and the AMTV longitudinal
control system to ensure that the AMTV will not attempt to enter an
intersection which is admitting cross traffic. In general, traffic
along the direction of the AMTV will be allowed to flow during AMTV
passage through the intersection. An electrical tie from the traffic
signal to the AMTV system will cause the intersection entrance section
or marker to command the AMTV to stop on a "yellow" signal whose timing
is appropriately adjusted to ensure that an oncoming AMTV can stop
before entering the intersection. All intersections through which
an AMTV route passes must either be signal controlled or must have
stop signs for cross traffic.
5. Turn Capability
Closely related to signal coupling at intersections is the
capability for an AMTV to safely execute turns in a mixed traffic
environment at intersections. A right turn can be implemented in a
straight-forward manner, but achievement of left turn capability is
more complex. Possible alternatives for left turn capability include:
(1) Introduction of an All Red Period in the Normal Signal
Cycle - The success of this method will depend on assuring
that the AMTV lane is clear of stopped vehicles ahead of
the AMTV when the AMTV receives the clear signal.
(2) Special AMTV Left Turn Lane and Signal - The need for lane
changes by the AMTV in order to enter the left turn lane
is a drawback to this method.
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6. Guideway and Intersection Protection
Roadside sensors may be required to (1) detect a car on a cross
street which is likely to run a red light (errant vehicle), and (2)
detect intrusion into the semi-guideway. While a guideway intrusion
detector may be conceptually simple, an errant vehicle detector could
prove more difficult to devise. Such sensing capabilities do not
presently exist in the required form. If needed, the capability will
have to be developed.
7. Scheduling and Dispatching-
Appropriate procedures and devices for dispatching and spacing
multiple AMTVs on a single lane need to be developed. Conceptually,
automatic methods can be devised in which AMTVs are added to or withdrawn
from service (dispatched) on the basis of occupancy sensors, and which
do not require real time communications from each vehicle to a central
dispatching area. Similarly, spacing (scheduling) of AMTVs on the route
can be accomplished by selectively delaying the departure of each AMTV
from a central dispatching station. The details of such concepts need
to be worked out and the need or lack of need for real-time communications
to each AMTV must still be established.
8. Vehicle Checkout
As part of a complete AMTV system, procedures and equipment for
checkout of each vehicle before it enters service will be required,
and must be developed. Checkout can be automatic, manual or a combination
of both. Performance tests of the headway sensing, steering and braking
systems are vital (see specific items in the Hazard and Failure Mode
Analysis Section).	 Perhaps a more difficult task is the checkout of
system stationary elements such as longitudinal control markers including
signal couplers, curve and turn slowdown markers, etc. The function
of each of these should be checked out at least daily.
E.	 CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS
1.	 Fail-Safe and Reliable Design
As part of the development process involved in setting up an
operational AMTV system, detailed engineering of each vehicle and
stationary subsystem must be performed to incorporate fail-safe design
principles and to achieve reliable operation. This process is not
really a development activity; existing technology and hardware is
available and will guide the design in most cases, but many problems
unique to the AMTV concept must be addressed. The analysis in Section V
is an initial step in this process.
4-15
2.	 Long-Term Research and Development
Two specific areas deserve priority as long term Research and
Development tasks.
(1) Headway Sensors - Alternative sensor approaches, including
active scanning devices using laser sources should be examined
for applicability. Optical methods, radar and ultrasonic
devices should all be evaluated. Opportunity for improvement
by the combination of sensor types should also be considered;
for example an optical scanner for precise beam definition
plus an ultrasonic device or doppler radar for relative
velocity determination.
(2) Blockage - JPL experimental AMTV experience showed that
blockage of the route by other parked vehicles was a
frequent occurrence. Service and delivery vehicles were the
most common offenders, and would be expected in any urban
area. Therefore, a capability for an automated vehicle to
recognize a route blockage, maneuver around it at minimum
speed, and reacquire the cable after passing would be a
valuable asset. Mechanization of such a maneuver would be
conceptually simple, through a microprocessor controller
having prestored passing paths in memory. However, safely
executing even a simple maneuver like this in a complex and
unpredictable operational environment presents a very chal-
lenging problem. Therefore, the attainment of this capability
must be regarded as a long range goal. In the meantime,
it will be necessary to avert the blockage problem by making
rules to keep the AMTV path clear, and subsequently enforcing
them, a task that the AMTV passengers could help with.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
The demand for safety in transportation systems has always had a
strong influence on their development and use. Public vehicles such
as the AMTV must be perceived by their users as safe, and in practice
this has meant significantly safer than a private auto. Achievement
of such levels of safety in a new type of system is a challenging goal.
The safety analysis described in the following pages is intended as
a first step toward reaching that goal. The methodology described
in Reference 15 has been used as a guideline.
The safety analysis was undertaken without preconceived assumptions
or limitations. However, due to the volume of data .generated, the
scope was subsequently limited in order to concentrate on items unique
to the AMTV system concept. The AMTV system was assumed to follow
the system description found in Section III of this report, and the block
diagram shown in Figure 3-1 was used as a guideline. However, no assumptions
were made regarding implementation of the elements in the block diagram.
It should be noted that many of the system and subsystem require-
ments described in Section III have been conditioned by the results
of this safety analysis. The safety analysis proceeded in parallel
with the technology portion of this study and influenced the requirements
given there.
I
A. OBJECTIVE
The goal of this safety analysis was to perform a systematic,
step-by-step examination which would attempt to identify all possible
hazards, and identify one or more approaches toward eliminating each
hazard. A separate examination of each hazard was then made to determine
its severity and to establish priorities for implementing corrective
actions.
B. DEFINITIONS
1. Safety
Freedom from those conditions that can cause injury or death, or
damage to property.
2. Hazard
Any condition that can potentially cause injury or death or
damage to equipment or property.
IG^^'S' PAGE
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3. Failure
A condition resulting in the inability of the system to perform
the designated function. A failure may or may not constitute a hazard.
4. Fail-Safe
A characteristic of a system which ensures that any malfunction
affecting safety will cause the system to revert to a state that is
known to be safe.
G.	 METHODOLOGY
The analysis was performed in two parts. Part 1 was the
Hazard Modes, Effects and Prevention Analysis (HMEPA). It included
all hazards which were related to operat i on of a properly functioning
AMTV system. The origin of these hazards tended to be people related,
involving actions of either passengers on the AMTV, pedestrians, or
vehicles which interact with the AMTV. Part 2 was the Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA). It involved failures of the AMTV hardware
and the hazards resulting from such failures. Established techniques
for conducting failure mode analyses which have been used in space
mission development were used (Ref. 16). Of course, every failure does
not necessarily constitute a hazard. In this analysis, the safety
implications of hardware failures were emphasized, but it should be
recognized that any failure results in a loss or degradation of service..
For this reason, high reliability, or the absence of failures is also
an important goal.
By Its nature, the first steps in the safety analysis tend to
be qualitative and intuitive. A list called a hazard catalog, which is
made as complete as possible, was first compiled, based on experience and
on an understanding of the function of the system.	 Slibsequently, the
effect to be expected if each hazard is activated and the probability
of such activation are estimated in order to determine severity.
Tentative corrective actions are also identified at this stage. The
complete hazard catalog is presented for reference as Appendix A
and the failure mode catalog is contained in Appendix B. In order
tc condense the volume of information to a more manageable level after
compiling the two catalogs, two criteria were used to select significant
hazards for further consideration.
(1) The hazard severity estimate
(2) A judgement that the hazard was unique to the operation of
the AMTV system, rather than one which other transportation
modes or the general public are also subjected to.
The significant hazards thus selected are presented in tabular
form in Table 5-2, and are discussed in the Findings and Recommendations
Section E. below.
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D.	 PROCEDURE
A flow plan for the Hazard and Failure modes analysis is presented
in Figure 5-1. Each block in the diagram, briefly described below,
represents one step in the process.
1. Identify Hazard Categories and Failure Categories
The initial step in the safety analysis is to establish broad
hazard categories and to develop a fault tree structure for the failure
mode analysis. The categories are kept general and comprehensive to
help avoid unintentional omissions. The elimination of irrelevant
or less important hazards is done later.
2. Identify Hardware Failure Modes
One hazard category is system hardware failure. The first step
in performing the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is to identify
all hardware failure modes. This process is also intuitive, but is aided
considerably by the system block diagram found in Figure 3-1 and fault
tree diagrams such as Figure B-2. An effort is made to be comprehensive
in order to prevent inadvertent omissions. Pgain, the list is subsequently
sorted during the following risk assessment step.
3. Identify Failure Effects
The probable consequence of each failure is identified. This is
actually done in parallel with the failure identification step.
4. Generate Initial Preventative Actions
If it is possible to identify a tentative fix for the failure, it is
done in the initial preventive action block. This information is used as
a source of ideas later when more detailed preventative actions are
developed. Each failure effect is assessed later to evaluate the possible
hazard resulting from it.
5. Identify Hazard Modes
The hazard categories not related to hardware are studied using a
process analogous to that just described, called the hazard Modes,
Effects, and Prevention Analysis (HMEPA).
6. Identify Hazard Effects
Having identified all the hazard causes for each hazard category,
the probable hazard effects are then identified. If a hazard prevention
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Figure 5-1. AMTV Safety Analysis Work Flow Plan
technique is known at this time, it is also recorded for later reference
as part of 4 above.
7. Risk Assessment„
A risk Assessment was conducted in order to identify in a reasonably
systematic way the irrelevant or minor hazards and to identify the
more important hazard areas for further elaboration. The risk assessment
was achieved by assigning intuitive ratings to hazard severity (S),
probability of occurrence (P), and control cost (C). The ratings were
obtained by having each member of the study team independently assess each
item, and then averaging their judgements, expressed in numerical form
as defined in Table 5-1. The resulting assessment ratings are included
in the hazard catalog in Appendix A and B. The risk ratings assigned
range from 4 (catastrophic) to 1 (negligible) for hazard severity
(S), from 4 (high) to 1 (almost never) for.probability of occurrence
(P), and from 4 (none) to 1 (high) for control cost. If the identified
hazard was felt to be beyond the scope of this study, it was categorized
as "not applicable".(N/A) and not considered further.
Table 5-1. Risk Assessment Table
Values
Elements
4	 3	 2	 1	 N/A
Hazard	 Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible Beyond
Severity (S)
	 the
Scope
of
Probability of
	 High	 Moderate	 Low	 Almost	 This
occurrence (P)
	 Never	 Study
Control Cost (C)	 None	 Low
	
Moderate	 High
8. Identify Significant Hazards
Important hazards which should receive early attention in future
AMTV development were identified by applying the following criteria.
(1)	 All hazards for which S + P ^_ 6 are considered to be
significant hazards.
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(2) All hazards for which S + P < 4 are deleted froirlurther
consideration.
(3) All Hazards for which S + P = 5 are individually assessed;
specifically, all C = 2 and S = 3 are considered to be
significant hazards.
This process was necessary in order to reduce the size of the hazard
list to a more reasonable length before further examination of the
important hazards. Note that the risk assessment process creates a
priority order for the hazard catalog, which, although not explicitly
presented, can guide future investigation.
9.	 Recommend Corrective Actions
Once the significant hazards were established, a more thorough
examination was made in order to generate recommendations for preven-
tive actions for these significant hazards. Information contained in
the initial preventive actions column was re-evaluated with an ultimate
goal of achieving a truly "fail-safe" design. Once recommendations were
developed, they were listed in tabular form as part of Tables 5-2 and 5-3
on the following pages to complete this study.
Further steps were identified in the flow chart but were not
carried out as part of this study. Using the present recommendations,
a plan for implementing these actions should be drawn. Plans for future
safety analysis activity were also identified as an item in the flow
chart. A safety analysis such as this is open ended in nature, as it
can accept newly identified hazards at step 1 or 2 as they are recognized,
and the entire process can be iterated in order to refine the priority
ordering and ideas for corrective actions.
E.	 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In any initial demonstration of a new concept such as the AMTV
there will inevitably be hardware bugs and unforeseen safety problems.
Such events could lead to serious problems in an AMTV system if not
closely monitored. The frequency of these events will decrease with
experience. Those using the AMTV and pedestrians that interact with
it will gradually become more familiar with it, and its operation will
become smoother as a result. Without using standby "drivers" or
"operators" with manual vehicle controls, it will be very desirable to
provide good coverage ofimportant points on the route during the initial
learning period by attendants either at the roadside or on the vehicle.
Each attendant should have means for stopping the vehicle and subsequent
manual override, if that should become necessary, using a key. Appropriate
use of attendants during the critical experimental phase of a demonstration
could shift a significant load away from foresight and prediction of
future system behavior into real-time monitoring and correction, a
much easier task. For example, the question of whether or not an AMTV
can safely negotiate cross traffic (vehicles or pedestrians) can be
answered empirically by allowing an attendant at the site in question
P A^ E 1b
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to override automatic control if that becomes necessary to ensure safety.
Empirical answers may well be the only ones possible in the subjective
area of AMTV interactions with other traffic.
	
1.	 Significant Hazards and Recommendations
Seven types of events have been singled out as significant hazards
for which preventive actions must be developed. These concerns are
as follows:
(1) Collision with another Vehicle - If physical interaction
between an AMTV and another vehicle is possible a significant
hazard results, and the probability of collision must be reduced
to the lowest possible level because of the probability of
serious injury in such an event. This item is discussed in
the context that vehicles can interact with the AMTV. It
is recognized that physical separation is also a preventive
action, and that in any early demonstration, vehicle inter-
action should be avoided or sharply limited.
(2) Collision with pedestrian.
(3) AMTV moves while passengers are boarding.
(4) Objects overhanging AMTV Route or missed by optical sensors.
(5) Objects beneath the headway sensor range.
(6) Objects protruding from the vehicle.
(7) Ice and Snow on Surface - This item is included, even
though our initial assumption was to limit application to
an ice-free region.
The details of these findings and recommendations are contained
in Table 5-2 following. The left column of the table lists the areas
of concern. The middle two columns suggest two types of corrective
actions, either by means of design or by procedure. Remarks, references
and notes are included in the right column.
	
2.	 Significant Failures and Recommendations
Six types of failure have been found to result in significant
hazards. Any one of these six significant hazard types can be thought
of as a single point failure possibility. The results and suggested
corrective actions are presented in Table 5-3• The format is identical
to that used for the significant hazard modes. Each subsystem level
failure mode identified can result from various specific circuit-level
failures. The significant failure modes are as follows:
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(1) Brakes fail due to control failure or hydraulic system
failure
(2) Headway sensors fail "off".
(3) Steering control failures due to control or hydraulic
system malfunction. Those failures producing a hardover
response are considered significant failures; passive
or steering centered failures are not.
(4) Speed control fails due to control failure or propulsion
failure. The result is an overspeed or a rollback condition.
(5) Road fixed stop or slow sensor fails.
(6) Vehicle chassis fails, for example a flat tire.
i
i
i
Table 5-2.
	
Summary of Hazard Analysis-and Recommendations
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
Design	 Procedure
t	 1. Collision with vehicle
A)	 En route collision. a) Provide physical pro- a)	 Create rules similar 	 -
Side swipe is tection for AMTV path to bike-way right-of-
most probable. such as low curb, or way laws; use painted
chain-link fence. lanes
f	
10 b) Provide all-around b)	 Inform the public
a bumper and body enelo- about the AMTV and
sure on AMTV to mini- its characteristics.,
mize damage in minor
collision
Fk
q
c) Provide distinctive
signal lights on AMTV
or audible warning
{ signal
r d) Provide side looking
,f proximity sensing
coupled to steering or
Q1i
:.1
Table 5-2.	 Summary
	 Yof Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 1)
r
R	 d d Pr ntiv Ac it ono
Significant
Hazard
ecommen a	 eve	 e 
Design	 Procedure
Notes
B)	 Collision by cross- a)	 Provide grade separation a)	 Limit cross-traffic a)	 Existing
traffic at inter- for AMTV vehicle speed thru traffic laws,
section intersection if if obeyed,
b)	 Provide fixed roadside appropriate cover this
sensing capability to sup- event
plement the on-vehicle
headway sensors.	 The
o primary capability sought b)	 A critical
should be detection of hazard,
vehicles likely to violate though very
a red signal improbable
c)	 Provide all-around bumper
and AMTV body design to min-
imize damage and injury in
the event of any collision
Table 5-2.
	
Summary of Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 2)
Significant
Hazard
Recommended Preventive Actions
Notes
Design	 Procedure
d) Program AMTV to move into in-
tersection at 2 mph for 1
length to signal intent to
cross. Then accelerate to 7 mph
e) Provide special audible or
visual signals while crossing
a) Grade separation at	 a) Left turn by MTV	 a) Safe left turns
intersection	 requires an all way
	 by an AMITV at a
red period for other	 signalized
b) special audible and visual
	
traffic	 intersection
signals as in 1) 5) f) above 	 poses a diffi-
cult and subtle
c) Provide conventional automotive	 problem.
turn signals on AIITV, coupled
	
Further study
to control system.	 and experiment
is needed
O
*d
J
V
C) Collision at
intersection
where AMTV turns
Table 5-2.	 Summary of Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 3)
L
JN
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
Design	 Procedure
d) Roadside sensors as 1) B) b)
above
e) Provide traffic islands
for right turzi
Contact bumper
will minimize
damage or injury
D) Vehicle moves into	 All items noted under A, enroute
path of AMTV too	 collision, would be effective
close for AMTV to
stop
2. Collision with pe-	 a) Provide bumper incorporat-	 a) Create rules or envi-
destrian. Pedestrian 	 ing emergency wheels-locked 	 ronment for pedes-
moves into path too	 stop switch. Surface should	 trians which dis-
close, or into side 	 be smooth, padded to mini- 	 courage walking within
of moving vehicle	 mize injury, and must extend 	 AMTV path
around sides of vehicle
a) Not a criti-
cal hazard;
serious
injury not
likely.
tf :;
I^
{
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Table 5-2.	 Summary of Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 4)
Significant
Hazard
Recommended Preventive Actions
Design	 Procedure
Notes
b) Develop control capability
	 b) Familiarize public with
based on existing headway AMTV characteristics
sensing components to detect
a late intrusion into path,
and react with stronger
braking
u, e) Develop audible signal,
especially for start up
3.	 AMTV moves while a) Provide doors interlocked
	 a) Provide instructions
	 a) Probability
passengers boarding with AMTV control for boarding at stop of occurrence
or getting off and on vehicle is high
b) Provide sensors capable of
detecting objects close to
side of vehicle
c) Provide treadle or hand-
actuated pressure switches to
hold vehicle during boarding.
Location should invite their
use instinctively without
specific instructions.
Table 5-2. Summary of Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 5)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design Procedure
4.	 Overhanging objects a)	 Extend contact bumper verti- a)	 Maintain regular sur- 	 a) An overhanging ob-
such as tree limbs cally.	 Allows damage to a veillance of route for struction is an
in path of AMTS' replaceable bumper panel, obstructions anomolous condition
such as an expendable wind-
shield switch. b)	 Establish rules to pre-	 b) The possibility
vent movable objects of an obstruction
b)	 Extend optical headway sen- stich as overhanging being missed by a
sor coverage vertically truck loads from intrud- properly function-
ing on AMTV path.	 (No ing headway sensor
c)	 An effective bumper-switch standing or parking falls into this
combination can protect signs might suffice) category.	 A clean
passengers and vehicle. mirror or piece
An emergency stop results c)	 Provide means for pas- of glass would be
sengers to stop vehicle. an example.	 An
A controlled stop may unlikely occurence
be better than a wheels-
locked stop because
there would be less
O inhibition about its
°i use
b
r
a) Downward vertical
curve can increase
this hazard.
Refer to Figure 4-1. x
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- Table 5-2.	 Summary of Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 6)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
Design	 Procedure
d) Provide means for pas-
sengers to report ob-
structions in a timely
way
`;
	
	 5. Small object on
road surface below
effective sensor
coverage
6. Object protruding
from AMTV (could be
►Q b,
	
part of chassis)
rb
^ b
r	 ^ ^
a) Design contact bumper switch a) Maintain regular sur
to cover any object large 	 veillance of route for
enough to cause damage to	 obstructions
AMTV
b) Provide strong bumper to min-
imize probability of damage,
and to deflect object from AMTV
path
a) Side bumper idea presented	 a) Prohibit carry-on of
in 2) a)	 protruding objects
b) Use closed vehicle design
such that object protrusion
is impossible
Table 5-2.
	
Summary of Hazard Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 7)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design Procedure
7.	 Ice/snow on route or	 a) Use snow tires or studded	 a) Provide monitoring func- a) System de-
severe weather tires tion capable of antici- scription has
pating conditions that excluded this
b) Design system so that a will degrade performance, hazard by ex-
lower speed could be used if and taking appropriate eluding AMTV
dictated by road conditions action to ensure safety operation in
i ice/snow en-
vironment.
However, fur-
ther investi-
gation of this
subject should
be made
Table 5-3. Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations
Recommended Corrective Action
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design Procedure
1.	 Brakes fail.	 AMTV a) Provide spring applied,	 a) Provide for daily a)	 Existing
will not stop as power released parking brake checkout procedure technology
commanded such that in case of power before placing vehicle used in
loss, spring will apply brake in service automated
guideway
b) Provide 4 wheel braking with	 b) Provide scheduled vehicle
dual (redundant) brake sys- maintenance plan design is
tem	 similar to normal applicable
automotive practice and should
O be used
vt e) Provide dynamic brakingS capability for redundancy.Dynamic braking can be
service mode to save wear
on mechanical brakes
d) Provide low hydraulic pres-
sure sensor which will com-
mand AMTV to stop
e) Provide accumulator to main-
tain hydraulic pressure if
pump stops
Table 5-3.	 Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 1)
i
co
Recommended Corrective Action
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design Procedure
f) Provide functional redun-
dancy in logic electronics
for backup
2.	 Headway sensors fail
A)	 Optical sensors fail a) Develop an in-service self-	 a) Provide daily checkout
such that obstacle check capability to detect procedure
not detected. outage of light source
b) Establish maintenance
b) Design: sensor so that loss plan
of power creates a "yes"
output.	 (see present
design)
c) Provide redundancy in sensor
design such that a single
component failure results in
degraded performance rather
than functional failure of
sensor system.	 Means to
detect component failure
must be provided.
iTable 5-3. Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 2)
Recommended Corrective Action
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
	
Des-'	 Procedure
B) Mud or dirt on sen 	 a) Provide appropriate lens 	 a) Provide daily checkout
sor lens; sunlight 	 hood to protect lens 	 procedure.
blinding of sensor
b) Optoelectronic design	 b) Establish maintenance
should provide "yes" out-	 procedures
put if detector saturated,
t-n	
such as by solar blinding
:a
c) Examine proposed route
geometry for possibility
of solar blinding and
eliminate possibility
C) Contact bumper	 a) Provide redundancy by having a) Provide instructions
switch fails.	 independent sections of	 for passengers as guide-
bumper switch area. 	 lines for use of opera-
tional stop switches,
b) Design bumper to minimize	 and emergency stop
likelihood of damage or 	 buttons.
injury even with failure
c) Use power source for sensors
that is independent from
propulsion battery.
I
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Table 5-3. Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 3)
a
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard Notes
i Design Procedure
d) Provide emergency stop
switches for passengers.
3.	 Steering Fails
A)	 Sensor fails hard a) Provide lateral aceelerom- a)	 Provide daily checkout 	 a) ExistingCO
over.	 Severe lurch eter to limit sudden steer- procedure before put- technology
can occur.	 AMTV ing input. ting vehicle in service. used in cable-
will stop, but can following
stray from desig- b) Provide redundant sensors b)	 Provide plan for automated
nated path by sev- with appropriate selection regular maintenance vehicles is
eral feet. logic. applicable
and should a:
c) Provide detection for this be used. r
condition which applies x
maximum braking. b) The hardover {
steering re-
d) Limit steering actuator sponse can be f`
slewing rate to the caused by a num- }
minimum value sufficient ber of component a
for safe and stable failure modes.
steering function. Failures result-:!
ing in centered
steering are
r,
1 	 01
°s
cni
Table 5=3. Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 4)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
Design	 Procedure
A) (coned)	 not considered
significant
hazards because
they will
result in
the vehicle
stopping
within the
designated
lane upon
loss of cable
acquisition
B) Actuator fails hard- a) Provide electrical limiting a) Same as above
over. Effect same	 such that normal operation
as above
	
cannot drive steering angle
to mechanical stop. Provide
mechanical limit switches
which dump hydraulic pressure
suddenly upon activation
b) Provide spring centering of
steering angle under power-
off condition.
Table 5-3• Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 5)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
Design	 Procedure
C) Acquisition signal	 a) Provide redundant acquisi- 	 a) Same as above 	 a) Requires
fails "on". Vehicle 	 tion signal sensor. Require	 second inde-
could move without 	 both signals before allowing	 pendent fail-
steering control	 AMTV to move.	 ure to acti-
from cable.
	
vate any
hazard.
D) Guide cable excita- a) Provide redundant monitoring a) Regular maintenance
tion out of toler-	 capability to keep cable	 plan.
ante. Possible deg-	 excitation within acceptable
radation of steering 	 limits; out of tolerance con
function while ac-	 dition should cause shut-
quisition signal	 down and signal for imme-
still present	 diate maintenance.
Table 5-3•
	
Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 6)
,,ni
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Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design Procedure
4.	 Speed control fails
A)	 Control logic fails, a)	 Provide redundant logic a) Daily checkout pro- a)	 Existing
so that speed com- function.	 Redundancy needed cedure technology
mand not consistent only for those circuits for automated
with existing which could result in an b) Regular maintenance vehicles is
inputs. overspeed condition if not plan. applicable and
obeyed. should be used.
c) Recovery plan needed
b)	 Independent power source for anomalous condi-
preferred tion to enable vehicle
to be returned safely
c)	 Provide battery level sen- for maintenance
sor to stop vehicle before
propulsion power is lost.
Table 5-3.	 Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 7)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard	 Notes
NF
Design	 Procedure
B) Motor control fails a) Provide independent speed	 Same as above.	 a) Tachometer
on. Overspeed con-	 sensor to detect overspeed 	 failure is
dition results.	 condition and apply brakes.	 possible
failure mode
b) Provide circuit within con-
trol electronics to compare	 b) Underspeed
measured AMTV speed with	 condition
cu=annded speed, and stop	 does not re-
vehicle if out of limits value	 sult in a
is detected	 hazard except
in case of
rollback, 4C
below
C) Motor control fails a) See B)b) above 	 Same as above
off. Rollback con-
dition results.	 b) Provide independent rollback
detector which applies parking
brake.
r0
^d
Table 5-3,. Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 8)
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design	 Procedure
5)	 Road fixed stop (or a) Provide fail safe or re-	 a)	 Same as above A critical
slow) sensor fails. dundant design for those failure if
Could result in components which couple AMTV stop signal
collision if it motion with a traffic signal is associated
occurs at an inter- with traffic
section.	 Failure b) Provide redundancy thru con- signal coup-
kn of a road-fixed slow trol of excitation of a seg- ling, or is
signal control re- ment of guide cable which at a traffic
sults in an over- is interlocked with signal. stop sign.
speed condition.
c) Designation of different
speed segments of route must
be redundant or fail-safe
(Faster speed requires
explicit enabling input such
as a guide cable modulation
to be present)
d) Design stop sensors to func-
tion over wider lateral excur-
sion of steering than allowed
by acquisition detectors
j
Table 5-3.	 Summary of Failure Mode Analysis and Recommendations (Continuation 9)
iN
rn
Recommended Preventive Actions
Significant
Hazard Notes
Design Procedure
6.	 Flat tire or other	 a) Develop sensor based on a) Daily checkout Existing
chassis failure. accelerometers which respond technology
AMTV will try to pro- to abnormal bumps or tilts. b) Maintenance plan applies.
teed, resulting in
further damage and e) Instructions to passen-
possibility of sec- gers on AMTV giving
and failure guidelines or stopping
vehicle
d) Provide system surveil-
lance, perhaps at one
point on route.
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APPENDIX A
SAFETY ANALYSIS DATA
HAZARD MODES, EFFECTS, AND PREVENTION ANALYSIS (HMEPA)
HAZARD CATALO'S
NOTE
This Hazard Modes, Effects, and Prevention Analsis (HMEPA)
deals with those hazards involving interactions between
humans, other vehicles, procedures, and environments. It is
assumed that the AMTV is operating properly; hazards origin-
ating from hardware failure are covered under the Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
a
N
010
!ro
w
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard
Categories
A. Collision
with
vehicle
Hazard	 °isk	 Preliminary
Modes
	 Hazard Effects	 :> F
	
Preven'i^r/Pe^ark
1. Vehicle collides with AMTV
	
3ideswlpe :s ^oW. probable. Poth A.'4TV	 u ?Z,	 a. Provide ri ght-of-stay fnr
on route	 and pan:=ger nouid receive connider-	 AMTV over other vehicles.
atle dacaFes and injuries. b. Provide all around bumper
to rini-7ize dama ge in the
event of a minor burp.
c. Install a signal light to
indicate that AMTV is
approaching.
2. Vehicle moves into AMTV
path too close
1
W
3. Cross traffic collision
AMTV at the present tiwe does not have
the capability to detect approaching
objects outside of its lane. AMTV
unable to stop before collision.
Ca rious injury not likely.
Critical hazard. Both AMTV and
passengers could receive consid-
erable damages and injuries.
3 2 2	 a. Sensitize the "all around
bumper" mentioned above
such that any otiiect
within six inches from it
will cause it to sto p or
slow the vehicle.
b. Indicate AMTV route with
double yellow lines or
curbin g such that
vehicles will not try tc
edge into that lane.
4 2 3 It has been su ggested that
AMTV should make a certain
amount of noise.
a. Provide ,grade senaration.
b. Provide roadside sensors
for warning of right-of-
way violation.
c. Fail-safe signal
coupling required.
d. Provide warning lights.
W
3^\
sj
Y
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Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard
	
Hazard
Categories	 Modes
4. Left/right turn collision
I
a
1
Jr
Pazard Effects
This could result in any of the above
three hazard conditions.
Risk Preliminary
S P C Prevention/Remark
4 2 3	 a. AMTV must have direction
indicators to tell other
vehicles that it is going
to make a turn.
b. AWN may trivaer inter-
section signals to he all
red for sufficient dura-
tion before makin g a safe
turn.
c. AMTV mi ght not start the
left turn from the left-
most lane, therefore it
is very important that
vehicle behind AMTV are
warned by signal lights.
d. AMTV path best be
located adjacent to
pedestrian sidewalks.
Make the right turn simi-
lar to an automobile
along the right_ curb and
only on green light.
Make the left turn by
first having all four
signals turn red and
then enter the inter-
section to make a left
turn.
5. Vehicle backs into AMTV
(AMTV may be already
stopped)
1. Pedestrian or cyclist
enters path too close
for AMTV to stop
Vehicle exiting from driveway could
hit AMTV broadslde. Vehicles backine
into parallel parklnv could run into
AMTV; P.MTV does not backup.
Pedestrian/cyclist could be injured
If walked or strayed into side of
moving PMTV.
vi
b
A. Collision
with pedes-
trian
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard
	
Hazard
	
Risk.	 Preiiminary
Categories
	
Modes
	
Hazard Effects
	
S P C	 Prevention/Remark
NOTFS
Green
Red	 °ed
Green
Fight Turn
^	 r
D
	 Red
i
Ch
	
RedRed
Ped
i
i
Left Turn
AMTV Route
Ref: HMEPP A.0
2 2 3
	
Public education as well
as some public relations
will reduce this risk as
well as the ones (1 thru h)
above.
2 2 2	 a. Education of the public is
needed.
b. Make AMTV physically smooth
and padded so it won't in-
flict injury other than
knocking a person off balance.
c. Incorporate emervencv stoo
switches in bumper.
d. Develop special lovic to
detect anomalous condition
from heading sensor inputs
and command ouick stop.'
.`__.. ., .... _..^.	 ,....^,. 
.A3+^• ,.,.	
....	 ^..	
^^lm	 anrws^^^a'e ,^1e1lks,^siMPee	
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Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard Hazard Risk	 Preliminary
Categories Modes Hazard Effects S P C	 Prevention/Remark
E. Fire; 1. Excessive heat on flam- Seat material, etc., could catch fire 1 1 2	 Use non-flammable materials
Environ-
mentally
Caused
mable materials from concentrated heat source. only.
2. Burning fire on AK V route	 Fire could be intentionally set or
could be from other cause, such as a
burning tree.
Fire;
People
Generated
3• Lightning strikes
4, Passenger smokinv
5. Passenger carrying on
explosive luggage
Occurrences of lightning strikes are
conceivable.
Passenger smoking might be both
irritating other passengers and
causing burns and fires to AMTV.
An accident from the carry-on
explosive can incur great damage.
3 1 1
	 AMTV sensors will not be
able to detect this unless
solid material is there.
Educate the public to the
existin¢ emergency stop
switch.
2 3 1	 a. Prohibit smoking on AMTV.
b. Use non-flammable
material.
N/A
	
Prohibit carry-on of
explosives.
9
1
5. Intentional:; Set Passenger could intentionally set AMTV	 N/A
on fire. AMTV could be destroyed from
such an act.
Promote good public rela-
tions during early steaes.
Ask for community co-oper-
ation. Advocate passenger
policing system.
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
L
Hazard
Categories
Hazard
Modes Hazard Effects
Risk
S P C
Preliminary
Prevention/Remark
C. Weather 1. Rain water damaging AMTV Rain water could damage the AMTV and 2 3 2 AMTV has to be designed to
effects its electronics. suit the weather of the
local area..
2. Sensor failing operation Optical sensors could be insensitive 3 1 2 This mode has to be furtherQn^
in fog in fog and other low visibility
conditions.
studied to isolate the
limitations of sensor capa-
bilities.	 Present design
--ecuires visibility of 25-ft.
tense fog will produce a
Q}`'1 /^f
sensor response, and a
V slow command.
3• Contact bumper interferred Low overhead power line could produce 1	 1	 1 Any interference signal
by EMI from overhead power EMI to alter the sensitivity (or pick would fail the bumper in
lines up noise signals and affect contact stopped condition.
bumper performance.
11. Mud, dirt, etc., obscure
	
Optical sensors will degrade. 	 0 3 2	 a. Require regular main-
sensor vision
	 tenance procedure.
b. Provide appropriate pro-
tective lens hood.
5. Ice/snow on route AMTV could slide if traveling on
snow. Collision can result.
U 2 3	 a. Use snow tires at locales
where ice/snow exists.
b. Heating of AMTV path
also suggested. Need
further study on this.
6. Severe weather	 Hailstorm, heavy snow, floodin g„	 NIA	 Vesigr AM-TV to suit local
conditions	 earthquake, high wind, extreme 	 weather conditions. Provide
cold weather, etc., can all degrade	 procedure to avoid operating
performance or cause system failure.	 in hazardous environment.
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard	 Hazard	 Risk	 Preliminary
Categories	 Modes
	
Hazard Effects	 S P r	 Prevention/Remark
D. Vandalism	 1. Hot wire AMTV	 AMTV performance would be unpredict-	 2 2 2	 Desirn comnonents such that
able and damages and injuries could 	 (N/A)	 no easy accessibility was
results.	 available. Tires be placed
behind locked chassis doors.
3 2 2	 Have brake line not acces-
I A)	 sible. Provide brake line
pressure detection tech-
nique. Low pressure, AMTV
will stop.
2. Brake line cut
	
AMTV will be endangered.
AMTV will probably not move. Put if
blinders were of low emissivity,
sensors could be inactivated.
2 2 2	 Simulate this mode and
(N/A)
	
obtain information on
effects. Public cooperation
needed for prevention.
9
1
CO	 3. Put blinders on sensors
4. Unscrew the seat from AMTV 	 Passenger could be inured from 	 2 2 2	 $Kular maintenance. Seat
unanchored seat.
	 (N/A)
	
fasteninv locations
Inaccessible from outside
of vehicle.
5. Time bomb AMTV	 Could be very serious, but probability
	 N/A	 Promote public relations and
of occurrence is no greater than an	 provide reliable service.
average public location
6. Intentional diversion of 	 Degrade system operation; cause
AMTV from route
	 possible collision.
2 2 2	 AMTV will stop when snn.de-
(N/A)	 wire is lost. Fliml;oa!se
manual override devices on
AMTV. Instead, reouire key.
See also manuall y operation
for fun.
„. , ,
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard	 Hazard
Categories	 Modes	 Hazard Fffects
7. Cuidewire disruption 	 Preaking of guldewire will cause
system to stop.
X 4
Risk	 Preliminary
P C	 Prevention/Femark
2 2 2	 Exciter should have means
(NIP) to realize when a segment
of gutdewire Is 41srunt,ed
and activate warning.
B. Manually operating for fun	 Result unpredictable.
a
r
2 2 2	 All the manual mode
(N/A)
	
operating parts, such as
joy stick, accelerator,
etc., should be on a olua-in
unit which is manually
carried by serviceman. The
plus-in connector has a
locked cover to prevent
tamnerinp.
9• Let air out of tire	 AMTV could tilt and cause deroutement. 	 2 2 2	 Make tires hard to get to by
Vehicle will stop from loss of guide 	 (N/P)	 having a cover. The use of
cable, but nevertheless collision	 dual chamber tires will bold
could result.	 pressure, even if the outer
chamber fails.
10. Hijacking by adding guide-	 Could lead vehicle to undesirable 	 2 1 3	 a. Do not reveal what fre-
wire	 location. Could cause unpredictable	 (N/A)	 quency the guide cable
damage.	 carries.
b. Make control signal
more complex than
single freouencv.
11. Additional stops induced 	 Would delay trip and make usage of
system less attractive.
2 1 1	 a. Make stop markers more
(N/A)	 complex than a single
magnet.
b. System surveillance
function.
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard
	
Hazard
	
Risk	 Preliminary
Categories	 Modes
	
Hazard Effects
	
S P C	 Prevention/Remark
E. Electric	 1. Electrostatic charge from
	
Passenger could get a shock
	
1 1 1	 Use seat material which
shock	 friction between seat and
	
(N/A)	 will not collect charge.
clothing materials
2. Passenger hand stop switch	 Passenger receiving shock from stop
	
1 1 1	 Improbable injury to pass—
exposed	 switch.	 (N/A)	 enger. Volta ge on switch is
9
	
is 5 volts.
O
3. Battery shorted to AMTV	 Heat or spilled electrolyte
body	 could cause injury
V
r
r
r Cs.
U
1 1 1
	
One side of the battery is
(NIP) connected to the AMTV frame,
using a small wire. Should
the other terminal of the
battery be connected to the
frame the wire would melt.
The purpose of the battery
being connected to the frame
is for EMI reduction to the
electronics.
2. Objects on route below
	 A big rock or fallen tree limb could
sensor range	 could cause vehicle damage and
passenger injury.
a
1
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard
Categories
Hazard
Modes Hazard Effects
Risk	 Preliminary
S P C
	
Prevention/Remark
F. Passage 1. Overhanging objects above AMTV could collide with an overhang 4 3 2	 a. Maintain routing surveil-
inter- optical sensor range tree limb, sign, etc.	 Damage and lance to assure that all
ference injury might result, overhangs are at least a
(Route certain height margin
blockage) away
b. Extend contact bumper
vertically to full AMTV
height to detect this.
3. Hole in pavement or
	 AMTV may be damaged and passenger
excavation
	 injured.
3 2 2	 a. Sensor range should be
expanded to include
vertical plane as well
as the horizontal.
b. Design the lower front
part of AMTV to a snow
plow shape so that it
will be able to push the
object on route along
the way rather than run
over it.
c. Design (b) above into a
center-pointed shape so
that object on route will
be pushed to the side and
not be run over.
d. Assume b) and c)
above do not have
sharp edges.
2 3 2	 a. Route maintenance
function.
b. Procedure for notifi-
cation of AMTV personnel
if hole must be dug.
c. Develop sensor to
detect holes.
d. Include inspection for
holes as part of daily
route checkout.
r
i
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Hazard
	
Hazard
	
Risk	 Preliminary
Categories	 Modes
	
Hazard Effects
	
S P C	 Prevention/Remark
4. Parked vehicles partially	 Collision sensors will detect this and 	 1 4 2	 Post si gns prohibiting
blocking AMTV path
	 prevent problem, but it will break the	 stopping. Public education
system down and cause poor service. 	 program during early stages.
5. Object close to side of	 Boarding or deboardino passenger could	 1 2 2	 Safety panel on side of AMTV
AMTV be crushed between AMPV and object. to cause stop. Extension of
bumper sensitization idea is
applicable.
o. Protruding object from 	 Pedestrian or deboarding passenger
AMTV	 could get knocked down or clothing
caught.
? 2 2 Same as above. Also pro-
hibit carry on object pro-
truding to the outside of
AMTV periphery. Enclosed
AMTV will eliminate this
problem.
1
J
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Hazard
Categories
Hazard
Modes Hazard Effects
Risk
S P C
Preliminary
Prevention/Remark
G. Passenger 1. Passenger boarding from Passenger might be injured since AMTV 3 2 2 Public Education.	 Make
not the wrong side of AMTV would be moving and could not be street side inaccessible.
following stopped from the street side. On future enclosed vehicles,
instruc- have doors that open only
tion when stopped and on the
proper side.
i
2. Passenger boarding/leaving	 	 g Passenger might be injured b	 fall	 	 ^	 y 2 2 2
i
a. Reauest the public to follow
AMTV without pressing since the AMTV will be moving. instructions.	 Have signs
stopping switch posted both on vehicle and
at scheduled stop location
to explain boarding and
departing instructions.
a Clearly indicate the
1 location of stopping switch.
„	 W b. Provide treadles on doors so it
is difficult or impossible to
leave AMTV without stopping it.
3. Passenger breaking other Safety regulations were made to 2 2 2 Public education and safety
safety regulations protect passengers. 	 If broken, promotion needed.	 Minimize
oa-sequences are most likely that regulations and rules to
some 66:'! will not be properly pro- follow by properly designing
tected and possibly be injured. AMTV to exclude hazard
possibilities.
d
Fr
^
S 4. Passenger injured by Severe injury possible. N/A Flash red light when stopped
S other vehicle during like school buses.	 Do not allow
boarding vehicle to pass on the boarding/
deboarding side of A14TV
b
5. Passenger not being a. Passenger bumps head on roof N/A Design AMTV to prevent these
careful by not stooping. hazards from existing.
b. Passenger trips while getting on/
off of AMTV.
c. Passenger falling due to
lurching/emergency stopping.
d. Passenger getting caught in door.
Appendix A. AMTV Hazard Catalog
Risk	 Preliminary
S P C	 Prevention/Remark
N/A	 The lack of attendant or
possibly other passengers
creates a need for some
means to ask for assistance.
Further study as to route,
schedule (whether to provide
service during late evening
hours), street lighting,
etc., needed.
Hazard	 Hazard
Categories
	 Modes	 Hazard Effects
H. Passenger	 1. Robbery	 The aged and the handicapped
vulner-	 could be especially vulnerable
ability	 to this mode. Consequence of
to muggers	 occurrence could also affect
the community's acceptance.
a
N/A	 Further study needed. It
has been suggested that the
inside of AMTV be highly
visible from the outside by
means of good lighting,
windows, etc. Lockable
compartments and alarm
button are other suggestions.
Utilize practices and tech-
nology from AGT systems.
2. Kidnap	 Consequence of single occurrence
could affect the acceptance of
the system by the public.
Hazard
	
Hazard	 Risk	 Preliminary
j	 Categories.	 Modes	 Hazard Effects	 S P C	 Prevention/Remark
i
i	 I. Other	 Motor power not able to 	 On an incline, with the vehicle	 4 2 1
j	 overtake gravity on an 	 initially at a stop, the vehicle
incline during initial	 will roll backward at the instant
starting	 the brake is released and the
motor power is applied-.
i
a
1
i
1
Radiation from	 Eve damage if	 3 1 3
A study must be performed
to assure that the motor
will within a fraction of a
second from the release of
the brake be able to over-
take the gravitational force
on AMTV and proceed to
climb. Rollback protection
is required in the event
of inadequancy of pro-
pulsion.
Examine design for
compliance with
ANSI Z-136 at
each design
iteration.
. s--_a
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Figure B-2.	 AMTV System Fault Tree
Appendix B.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Preliminary" Risk
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
'	 I. VEHICLE
SUBSYSTEM
FAILS
I.A Servo-Tek Model No. 1. Output open (no When tach gives no 4 3 3 a) A fail-safe design is
TACHOMETER SB-740A-2.	 DC gener- output voltage) (low) signal, vehicle needed to eliminate
FAILS ator type with rotat- accelerates; high hazard effects.
ing armature and two signal decelerates.
brushes.	 Typical
ratings:	 1OV, 5mA. b) Modify design by adding	 3
Tach tracks motor and a comparator to compare 	 §
feeds signals back to command volta ge VC with
"speed control servo tack signal VT ,	 If
amp. VT<VC, signal vehicle
to stop.	 This comparator
can also control over
speed by stopping the
Xr
vehicle when VT>VC (max),
where VC
 (max) is the
command voltage for
maximum speed.
c) Alternate independent
overspeed prevention
system should be inves-
tigated.	 Utilize
existing technology
being used by other
vehicle systems.
2. Output short (no Same as above 4 3 3 Same as above
output voltage)
3. No input (broken Same as above 4 3 3 Same as above
or slipping tack
shaft)
	
low out-
i
,i
'I
i
i
I
put.
,
i
i
d
i
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S.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Pemarks
Z.B BATTERY	 6 x 6 volt batteries	 1. Completely dis- Dead battery will 2 4 2 a) The addition of a
MALFUNCTIONS	 250 amp-hr life, 200 charged affect every part of battery state of charge
amp max, 60 amps level vehicle operation. detector.	 Do not allow
cruising ave. 100 amp. Steering out of con- AN,TV to start new route
trot, brakes will loop if battery state is
not work, etc. too low.	 The evaluation
of a longer battery life-
time is needed.	 Prakes
should be redesigned to
be fail-safe euch that
the brake will apply if
power lost.
b) Provide separate
uninterruptible power
supply (UPS) for
critical control
functions.	 Low voltage
tolerance of control
system is also needed.
j-	 2,. shorting Shorting and exploding	 2 1 2or exploding can cause fire and
other injuries.
i 3. Leaking Leaking can cause	 2 1 2
burns or hardware,
i;
damage
4. Low ambient Low temp will make	 2 1 2
temperature battery state of
+ charge prediction
!! a more difficult
problem.
lR.
a
Appendix B.	 Failure Induced hazard Catalog
PreliminaryRisk
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P
 Prevention or Remarks
Ili
I.C. MOTOR
	
DC Series motor, 2HP, 1. Motor open Loss of motor drive 2	 1 2 Comparator mentioned
FAILS	 36V 2600 rpm, GE capability will in I.A is needed here
model 48JB-503 D. degrade vehicle to stop the vehicle when
Motor tracked by stopping ability. VT>VC(max).
tack and controlled
by SCR motor con- 2. Motor shorted Motor might over- 2 1 2 An overcurrent protection
troller heat and cause or thermal overload is needed.
I burning,
3• Motor-tack See I.A with no (low). 4	 1 2 Comparator mentioned
separation tach signal, vehicle in I.P applies here.
will accelerate
j 4. Motor disengaged If this mode occurs 4	 1 2 A speed detection system
from drive shaft when the vehicle is not tied to the motor
slope, added to the
1 and vehicle
	
provide afail-
electronics could safe design.	 The util-
`i all be functioning ization of existing tech-
properly, yet the nology is desirable.
vehicle Will be out
i
i
of control.
ii
I 	 ^ U
'i
i
'r
I
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
I.'D SCR GE C-155 Model 100. 1. Output too high Motor will overspeed 3 2 2 Comparator mentioned in
MOTOR Controls the amount of which in turn will turn I.A is needed here to
CON- current supplied to tack at a faster rate. stop the vehicle when
TROLLER motor by varying the VT>VC(max)-
FAILS frequency of square-
wave pulses.	 Has dual 2. Output low or Low motor input. 1 2 2 Underspeed comparator'
direction capability, grounded Rollback condition in I.A will stop vehicle_
is, forward and re- results.
verse directions.
3. Output erratic Motor power applica- 2 2 2 If amplitude exceeds high
tion variable.	 'Ride and low limits, comparator
might be less com- will stop vehicle.
fortable.
i
by 4. Degradation or Dynamic braking could 4 2 2
i
Undesirable event.	 Further
i doss or bi-direc- be degraded.	 Motor investigation needed,
tion capability forward drive capa- although not a single point 	 j
bility could be de- failure.	 Need to have
graded also, capability to switch from
the detection of this
failure mode to using	 q
redundant braking con-
trolled	 by the under/
overspeed comparator.
5. Output stuck on high Vehicle will continue 3 2 2 ' a) Comparator should detect 	 I
regardless of input increasing speed. this failure mode.
^ command. b) Independent overspeed 	 j
detection.
6. VM input (from Vehicle will,continue 3 2 2 Fix should be implemented at 	 j
speed control) re- to travel at a con- previous stage, speed control	 1
mains on high stant speed. servo amp.
7. V input (from This is same as last 1 2 2 No action reouired, since
speed control) stage speed control vehicle will not move. 	 111
shorted to ground servo amp tran- Utilization of existing
(low) sistor C-E Short. technology is desirable.	 j
This occurrence fails- 1
motor power:
j
f
Appendix B. Failure InducedHazard Catalog
Description
	 Failure Modes Failure Effects
Risk
S P C
Preliminary
Prevention or Remarks
1	 T.E BRAKE	 1. Leaks Loss of hydraulic 2 3 3 No sure way to prevent
ACTUATOR pressure this from happening
j	 FAILS except by regular main-
tenance and checkout.
2. Fails on (stuck Loss of hydraulic 1	 12 The hydraulic brake
on) braking capability, fluid is not compatible
'
however vehicle would with the hydraulic
^- not go anyhow. system fluid:	 the two
^	
3. Fails off Loss of hydraulic 4 1 2 are separated by a
braking capability_ floating piston.	 There
is no provision to check
the brake fluid! 	 Need a
reservoir with sensor
6 detect fluid level_
Present vehicle has two
wheel hydraulic brakes.
Future vehicles should
have 4 wheel brakes with
dual hydraulic brake sys-
tem & an indicator to
tell if one system is
i
defective.
Appendix B. Failure Induced. Hazard Catalog
Y
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
I.F VEHICLE	 Tram consists of 1. Flat tire Vehicle operation 3 2 2 a) Use dual chamber tires.
CHASSIS	 tires. axle, and with flat tire(s) Even if outer ruptures,
FAILURE
	
frame. will be unpredictable tire will still hold	 ?^
and therefore hazard- pressure.	 fi
ous b) Road clearance detector.
c) System surveillance at
one point on route.
d) Regular maintenance
e) Daily checkout
2. Axle and frame Occurrence most un- 3	 1	 1 Axle conservatively rated.
malfunction likely although effect
could be significant.
o
^Q
p
j
rU
i
i{
j
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Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
I.O Two brake shoes forced 1. Hydraulic. brake Hydraulic fluid loss 2 3 3 See remarks in I.E.
HYDRAULIC against brake drum viz cylinder leaks will cause degreda- Periodic maintenance
BRAKES hydraulic brake tion. and checkout procedure
to MALFUNCTION cylinder should be generated to
1 eliminate this mode.
O
2. Hydraulic 'brake Brake could get stuck. 2	 1	 1 Same as above.
cylinder jams
3. Horn brake shoes Braking will be 2 1	 1 Same as above.
degraded.
f,',	 ..
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Appendix B. Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
ji
Risk
Description— 	Failure Modes	 Failure Effects	 S P C	 —
	
tb	 I.H. MANUAL	 Operation of 'vehicle	 Any of manual mode 	 a) Unpredictable.	 2 2 3
	
1	 OPERATIONS	 can be manually con- 	 operations fail..	 Could compromise
FAIL	 trolled thru various	 ability to return
manual mode attach	 vehicle for service
ments'including brak	 in the event of
ing, steering, accel 	 other failure.
erator, and forward/
I	 backward control.
i
"j
i
Preliminary
Prevention or Remarks
Same as above.
I
wi^
Appendix B.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects
i	 II. STEERING
SUBSYSTEM
FAILS
1I.A Guide cable is a 1. Cable broken Vehicle Will not
GUIDE buried wire perma- operate without
CABLE AND nently installed in detection of this
'i	 EXCITER FAIL a saw cut in road signal.
pavement.	 A signal
'f of a little less thanj
10 KHz will be trans-
mitted through cable by
I	 tri an exciter..
N
2. Cable shorted Same as above
3• Exciter outputs no Same as above
jsignal
Risk	 Preliminary
S P C	 Prevention or Remark_
2 2 3	 a) Monitoring circuit
at exciter should
detect out of tolerance
current and shut down,
if found.
b) Acquisition signal de-
tection on vehicle needs
periodic check for accu-
racy.
c) Use of dual guide cable
system with automatic
switch over is a redun-
dant solution,.
2 2 3	 Same as above
2 2 2	 Same as above
1	 4. Exciter outputs	 The behavior of	 2 3 3
improperly (high
signal, noise,
etc.)
5• Metal plate over
guide cable
vehicle under this
failure mode is
that steering will
become erratic_
Guide cable field
will be disrupted..
2 3 3	 a) A maintenance function
b) Experimental tests
needed.
c) Provide two steering
sensors - one at front,
one at rear of vehicle.
ry}j
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Appendix B.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
PreliminaryRisk
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
II.B PICK-	 Pickup sensor of 18 1. One or more Summing amp when de- 3 3 2 a) Loss of one channel will
UP SENSOR	 side-by-side vertical- coils and/or tecting one signal shift vehicle center off
FAILS	 axis coils location at associated air- less will ignore course by one inch.
same height above road cuits fail that missing signal. Acquisition signal will
and at right angle to Vehicle will behave stop if cable lost.	 A
guide cable.	 These as if defective possible dual (redun-
signals are shaped, channel is not there. dant) system will
pulse detected, and When failure occurs increase reliability.
summed.- Output of with large off center
this sensor goes into bias (ie, several b) Periodic checkout per
steering servo amp to coils failed from one written procedure needed
t command steering actu- side), vehicle will to detect coil anomalies.
W
ator. -There are two not be able to	 '
additional horizontal function properly c) Alsu, if failure of
coils included as at a curve. coils is enough to shift
reference signals. vehicle off axis far
enough, scheduled stop
- sensor (buried magnet)
would be missed and
vehicle will miss its stop.
2. Pickup sensor Vehicle proceeds 3 2 3 Another failure required
fails while ahead until acqui- before hazard occurs.
centered sition signal ceases.
3. Pickup sensor Vehicle turns 4 2 3 Serious problem.	 Needs
fails when off suddenly before it independent accelerometer
center can be stopped input to limit lateral
i
acceleration.
I
Appendix B. Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
II.0 The steering servo amp 1. Hydraulic steering Position of the feed- 3 2 2 Redundancy needed.
STEERING accepts an input Vs servo amp input/out-- back pot not tracked,
ACTUATOR (±5 Vdc) from the pick put fail. steering capability
FAILS up, sensor and drives the degraded or possible
spool in the control loss.	 Hydraulic con-
valve to feed hydraulic trol valve not re-
pressure to the appro- ceiving proper signal
priate side of the ac- to operate steering
tuator.	 Actuator will actuator.
steer the wheels move-
ment tracked and picked
m up via a feedback pot. j
p 2. Feedback pot Will drive steering to 4 3 3 Same as above.
opens/shorts one ]limit.
3. Hydraulic control Steeriao_canability 4 2 3 Same as above.
valve malfunctions loss.	 Open winding Rate of drift
will cause steering will depend upon
to drift to one limit. mechanical zero
adjustment of valve.
4. Hydraulic Steering capability 4 2 2
steering actuator loss
malfunctions
Z
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Appendix S.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects	 S P C Prevention or Remarks
II.D Supplying pressure to A failure in either the
	 Eventual loss of
	 4 3 3 a) For steering, need a
HYDRAULIC the hydraulic system motor or the pump, or steering as well as means to stop vehicle
MECHANISM are ,motor, ` pump, and a leak in the lines the hydraulic braking if hydraulic pressure
[ FAILS accumulators capabilities. falls below a certain
limit.	 For hydraulic
braking, a means such
that the loss of hy-
draulic pressure the
brake will be en-
gaged, be generated.
The present brake
system is connected by
a floating piston to
the hydraulic system
(due to incompatibility
of brake seals with
hydraulic fluid).	 A
leak in the brake
system would not
show up even if the
hydraulic system were
fail safe.
b) Addition of low pressure
sensor needed to stop
0
vehicle.
c) Utilization of existing
Fb,
failtechnology-safe
desired.
8 d) Hydraulic fluid level
indicator wa^sing light
to alert to loss of
t^
fluid.
Appendix B.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
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Preliminary
j
a
Risk
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects	 S P C Prevention or Remarks
III. SPEED
- CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM
FAILS
III.A	 CON'- Speed commands(slow, Inputs and outputs of All input OR gates, 	 4 2 3 To generate a corrective
TROL LOGIC stop, start, etc.) many of the IC's in the except the passenger action for the control
W	 FAILS will be combined to control logic could be stop, will produce logic failure modes will
provide a set of shorted to ground, tied a logical 1 if an require significant design
ramp-shaped voltages to power supply, open, open circuit occurs effort.	 A convenient loca-
which will direct the or short. between the gate tion to eliminate vehicle
speed control servo and the sensor; ie, misbehavior is at the
either to activate if a rri-headway speed control, SCR, motor,
SCR to a certain sensor line opens tack loop.	 The addition
pulse rate or the up the logic will of that comparator dis-
brake logic to apply receive a slow com- cussed in I.A, S.C, and
brake or reverse mand.	 A short I.D will stop the vehicle
motor field (dynamic circuit would dis- regardless of command
braking). able the signal errors made in the proceed-
i
p
input. ing stages.
_Appendix B.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
PreliminaryRisk
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects	 S P C Prevention or Remarks
IZI.B Speed control servo Last stage servo amp Full power on will
	 3 2 2 Another comparator is
SPEED amp accepts command transistor C-E short keep vehicle full, needed to compare
CONTROL from the control logic, will cause failure, speed ahead.	 When output of speed L ."^n-
SERVO AMP and feedback from the VT>VC vehicle Would trol servo amp witL
FAILS control supplies the have full dynamic the input command to
td motor, via SCR con- braking. assure their consistency.
troller; power in the This is similar to that
form of pulses.
	 The mentioned in Section Z.
rate of these pulses With full power limits
determines the amount - might not be exceeded,
of power supplied. but vehicle would not
obey command.	 Therefore,
the comparator above
should be made to stop
the vehicle and call
for help.
rCJ
V
l
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
III.0 Brake logic accepts 1. Fails to receive Commanded braking will 4 2 2 An investigation into using
'	 BRAKE command from control input command not result..	 'Vehicle the input OR's to provide
to	 LOGIC logic and signals could possibly be out some redundancy is needed.
I	 FAILS the brake actuator of control. The redundancy does not
00 to apply the hydraulic have to be two indenticalbrake or commands the paths, but rather dual
SCR to reverse the signal lengths.
motor current flow
to apply dynamic
braking.
2. Outputs to brake Possible improper com- 4 2 2 Need further investigation
actuator or SCR con- wand transmission, to what happens if failure
troller malfunctions hence vehicle not occurs and how to correct
(opens, grounds, functioning properly this deficiency.
shorts) (Predictably).
Appendix B. Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
III.D Scheduled stop detec- 1. A piece of metal Magnet field will be 4 2 3 For future sophistication,
SCHEDULED tion'is by means of laying over the interrupted and the, have a build-in distance
STOP sensing coil picking- buried magnet sensor will not pick interpretation capability
CONTROL up signal from a up any signal. via a mileage reader and
FAILS buried permanent compare with a pre -programmed
i
magnet, info.
2. A piece of unplanned Unplanned stop could - 1 2 2 a) Not safety related.
magnet on the ground be initiated by this
surface magnet.-
3. Sensor fails off Scheduled stop Will 4 2 3 a) System checkout procedure
not be executed. necessary.
Could possibly miss b) Redundant function
a .stop :sign. needed for intersection
control as this is
critical hazard.
4. Sensor fails on Vehicle stops immedi- 1 2 2 Same as above.
ately; not a safety
P	
i
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Appendix B. Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
IV.
HEADWAY j
SENSOR SUB-
SYSTEM FAILS y
IV. A Designed sense obsta- 1. Primary fails off. Vehicle will not slow 4 3 2 a) Self check sensor by
OPTICAL cles in time fora down upon distant reflecting a test beam	 i
SENSORS FAIL smooth stop.	 Primary object detection. from the source into
and secondary sensor the detector periodically
channels will provide
distant (25ft) andI close range (8ft) b) Use redundant sensor
object detection re- elements
spectively.	 The two
sensor channels are e) Examine individual
pulsed at two differ- element function in
ent frequencies (1KHZ, daily checkout.
N and 1.05KHZ) and self
O compared when reflect- d) Stop for test target
ed signal is received.
GaAs LED and Si de-
tector pairs are used 2. Secondary fails off. Vehicle will continue 3 2 3 Same as above
to detect the dif- at 2mph and not stop
fusely reflected light. until contact bumper
strikes the object.
3. Primary fails on. Vehicle will revert 2 3 2 Not a hazard
to 2mph automati-
cally.
4 . Secondary fails on. Vehicle will stop 1 2 2 Not a hazard
itself.
5. Threshold drifts up Vehicle will either 3 3 2 This is both a design
or down. fail to slow down or margin tolerance problem
reduce speed falsely. as well as time degrada-
ation problem.	 {
See items under IV. Al above
6. Aim error (from im- Will fail to detect 3 2 2 Periodic checkout required. 	 i
proper mounting or object or detect Tests under IV.- Al above
dislocating after "false alarm" from will check
mounting) • incorrect direction.
1{
y
1
Preliminary
Prevention or Remarks
# 7. Blinded by direct a) The signal to noise 3 2 2 a) Investigate on a sunshade
k8 sunlight. ratio becomes cover needed.
unacceptable for b) Correlate route see-
sensor operation. tions & time to avoid
" This is equivalent to this mode.
threshold drift., c) Design saturation
detection circuit to -
b) Saturation of detector yield "yes" output
'
will reduce signal
gain to zero.
,',	 ;	 CIf
8. Blinded by approach- Same as above. 3 3 2 Need to investigate
ing auto head lights. further.
q. Interferred by sen- Picking up false sig- 2 3 2 Limit signal divergence
sons signals emitted nal from that emitte2 range.	 Limit detector
from approaching (not reflected) field of view.	 Plan route
AMTV. vehicle will slow down. with sufficient spacing.
10. Insufficient headway 20mph vehicle will not 3 3 2 Need to add a third pair
sensing range for be able to stop with of sensors to detect long
20mph (needs 125ft).- the existing design. range object.	 For example,
use high-speed to detect
at 125ft 6 primary to
Q detect at 25ft.
11. Any of the optics Aiming error, thresh- 3 2 2 Daily preoperation per-
like the lenses old level can both formance check will detect
and the filters change see (5) A this mode.
Appendix B.	 Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
PreliminaryRisk
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
IV.B	 The contact bumper con- 1. Contact switches Loss of optical 3 2 2 Modified the contact switch
CONTACT	 sists of a horizontal fail inoperative sensor backup installation such that each
BUMPER FAILS	 rod mounted on a sus- complement the other, instead
pended resilient semi- each working independentlyloop and two micro of the other as they are now.
switches one on each The contact switches could
side of the rod-to-loop be push-pull switches such
contact.	 The contact that if one switch fails
bumper is 10 inches and the contact is made on
above the ground and that side, the pulling effect
ay extends 3 feet to the of the other side will act
front of the vehicle. as the redundancy.
N Any object in contactN
with the horizontal
rod will activate one
of the 2 micro switches
and stop the vehicle
immediately.
2. 'Contact switches Vehicle will be 3 2 2 Routine checkout needed.
Pail on abruptly stopped. Regular checkout and
inspection could avoid
this occurrence.
3• The rod or the semi- The contact bumper 2 2 2 Set up so that normal
loop or its mounting might be made in- indication to proceed
break loose active or stop the requires continuity and
vehicle. bias power on.
Appendix B. Failure Induced Hazard Catalog
Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
V.
ROUTE CONTROL
V.A The movement of the 1. Signal path opens The signal light will 4 2 2 Design the signal
INTERSEC- vehicle will be linked not be able to receive path such that an open
TION SIGNAL to the intersection' a command, therefore circuit will be alerted.
INTERFACING signal lights such that might conflict With
FAILS safe passage is ensured. vehicle movement.
The four-way signals
bd have all to be red
Nwhenthe vehicle is
W making a turn.
2. Fails with erratic The vehicle movement 4 2 3 Further study is needed.
transmission will not match signal
light.
3. Jams light on red Impede normal flow of 4 3 3 A detector can be installed
or 'green traffic.	 Endanger to check that signal varies
vehicle movement When at least once during, say,
signal conflicts. one minute; otherwise a
warning signal will be
generated.
4. Fails to make all Endangers vehicle. 4 3 2 Further study is needed
lights red
,,4
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Risk Preliminary
Description Failure Modes Failure Effects S P C Prevention or Remarks
V.B.	 When the vehicle ap- 1. Fails to choose Vehicle must be made 4 3 2 Must avoid vehicle from
ROUTE SELEC-	 proaches-a junction to cease motion when taking the wrong route when
TION-FAILS	 where route will split failure to choose failure of choice occurs.
into two, the vehicle occurs.
must possess the capa-
bility,to choose 2. Chooses the wrong Vehicle must be pre- 4 3 2, More work needs to be done.
which route to take. route vented from taking There ought to be capabil-
This can be achieved the wrong route ity for the central con-
by either using d'-f- both for convenience trol to detect that a
ferent cable frequen- and safety reasons. vehicle is stuck at a cer-
1 cies or energize only tain location.	 This capa-
one of the numerous bility ought to be Bevel-
cable to lead the ve- oped and can be implemented
hicle toward that route. with the localized signal
source concept such that
when one location sends a
vehicle to the next, it
tells the center that it
has done it and the center
ought to anticipate its
arrival at the location
within a certain duration.
Failure to receive a con-
firmation of arrival from
the next location will
indicate that the vehicle
is stuck between the two
locations.
l
i
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Risk	 Prelimima y
Description
	 Failure Modes	 Failure 'Effects	 S P C	 Prevention or Remarks
V.0	 Along the route, there 	 7. Fails off	 The 'vehicle will	 4 3 2	 More work is needed.
ROUTE SPEED	 are stretches that the	 continue to travel atAlso see III_D scheduled
CONTROL vehicle travels at the existing speed	 stop failure.
FAILS 20mph, 7mPh, 2mph regardless of what
(approaching scheduled the command signal
stop),, or fully says.
to stopped.	 The present
N' design does not have
1n all these capabil-
ities, but will have
to be incorporated.
2. Fails on Vehicle will change	 1 3 2	 Not a safety concern.
to the next lower
speed and proceed.
.^ eb
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APPENDIX C
ANALYTICAL MODELS OF AMTV
This appendix discusses analytical models for:
(1) Determining speed control parameters, including jerk, accel-
eration, deceleration and speed profile, to satisfy stopping
distance requirement and passenger safety/comfort requirement.
(2) Determining steering control parameters, including propor-
tional constant, slew rate, and geometry of the guide-wire
layout.
(3) Analyzing vehicle/pedestrian interactions as they relate
to system performance
(4) Defining schedules of vehicles and their headways for
operational efficiency.
All these models have been developed previously to analyze the
operation of a 7-mph AMTV system. (Ref 17, 18). Major results from
the previous analyses which have helped to clarify the AMTV operational
characteristics and system requirements are summarized in this appendix. 	 y
Also indicated is the possibility of extending these models for use in
analyzing AMTV operations at higher speeds. In particular, this appendix
presents in Figure C-1 a set of new curves that can help to determine
the best deceleration and jerk rates for a 20-mph AMTV to stop safely and
smoothly.
A.	 VEHICLE MODELS
1	 Speed Control Model
Assume that an AMTV uses constant acceleration and decelera-
tion rates with magnitude A-ft/sect`, constant jerk rate at R ft /sec3,
and maximum velocity V fps. The time-profile of acceleration or
deceleration can be depicted as followsF	
_ 
E
C-1
	
w
NU,
'_' Z
.O
Z ;=
O W<JQ W
yjWJ
W aV %_Q I	 \ TIME (SEC)
` t
ACCELERATION (DECELERATION) PROFILE
The equations for stopping time and stopping distance have been
derived before (Ref. 17) for two cases
(1) StoRping from maximum cruising speed V.
The stopping time is 3
V	 A
T1 =-+- sec
A	 R
a
The stopping distance is j
V2	 AV
X1 = -- + -- ft
2A	 2R
(2) Worst-case stopping
This happens when the vehicle is accelerating toward the
maximum speed and the headway sensor detects an obstacle.
it takes the braking system some time to change the vehicle
from accelerating to decelerating, causing additional travel- .
ing before stopping.	 The stopping time in this worst case is
V	 AT2 _ 
-+2- sec .,
A	 R
The stopping distance is
V2	 AV	
AA22A	 2R	 R	 6R {
C-2
w ,
An important design question is the following: Given a prescribed
distance (related to sensor range) within which a vehicle must be able
to stop, what values must be selected for deceleration (A) and jerk
(R) rates?
The solutions for a 7-mph vehicle were given in Reference 17.
It was shown that if the vehicle is to stop within 24 ft in the worst
case, one should choose A = 5 fps2 , R = 5 fps3. If the vehicle is to
stop within 22 ft, it requires that A = 5 fps 2 , and R = 6.5 fps3.
The solutions for a 20-mph vehicle are given in Figure C-1.
It can be seen that if the vehicle is required to stop within 130 ft
in the worst case, A 5 fps 2 and R = 5 fps3 are good rates to choose
2.	 Steering Control Model
A steering control simulation model was developed before (Ref. 18)
The results of simulation indicated that steering angle should be propor-
tional to the detected steering error. The proportionality constant
and the steering slew rate for a 7-mph vehicle were determined according
to the simulation results. The same techniques can be applied to the
20-mph vehicle and obtain steering, design parameters based on simulation
results.
B.	 SYSTEM OPERATION MODELS
1. Vehicle/Pedestrian Interface Model
This model was developed to study the effect of random pedestrian
crossings upon the average operating velocity of a 7-mph AMTV (see Ref. 17).
The resultsof simulation indicated that the average speed would be virtu-
ally unaffected by pedestrians as long as encounter frequency is less than
once every 8 seconds. The average speed would reduce to half of the
cruising speed if the encounter frequency increases to once every '2
or 3 seconds.
The results also indicate that significant improvement of average
speed can be achieved if pedestrians can be guided to yield the right of
way to an AMTV upon encounter.
This model is not needed for 20-mph operation because the vehicle
would be moving on an exclusive semiguideway at any speed higher than
-7, mph.
2. Scheduling model
A simulation model was developed previously (see Ref. 17) to study
the impact of random traffic disturbance and stochastic demand of passen-
gers on the average passenger waiting time at tram stops. The simulations
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Figure C-1
	 Required deceleration (A) and jerk (R) rates
to stop a 20 mph vehicle within prescribed
distance in the worst case
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were conducted for 7-mph operation under various scheduling policies.
The results have indicated the required frequency of tram dispatches
that would keep passenger waiting time within some ,limits. Moreover,
it was concluded that optimal scheduling policy depends on passenger
demand. In low-demand hours, scheduling by clock or dispatching on
demand should be adopted. In high-demand hours, vehicles should be
dispatched as frequently as possible. In medium-demand hours, the
frequency of vehicle dispatch should be correlated to the travel time
of a vehicle needed to complete a loop.
The same method can be used to study scheduling policies for
any particular application.
3.	 Headway Control Model
The purpose of a headway control model is to help understand the
effect of headway separations on system efficiency. A simulation model
was previously developed (see Ref. 17) for a 7-mph AMTV system with
one loop in the route. Headway control was exercised at a designated
static, on the loop by withholding an AMTV from leaving the station
until a predetermined headway condition was satisfied. It was concluded
that vehicles should be evenly distributed along the loop to prevent
bunching that, on average, prolonged passenger waiting at tram stops.
In high-demand hours, however, vehicles should not be withheld but
should keep moving to achieve highest volume of circulation.
